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INTRODUCTION 
The ideal of America as a racial and ethnic melting pot is a 
fundamental archetype in our national mythology. But discomfort 
with the idea of miscegenation and with the individuals born to 
parents of different races is equally fundamental to the American 
story. Indeed, one historian documents the punishment of Captain 
Daniel Elfrye for "too freely entertaining a mulatto" in 1632. 1 Since 
then, racial mixing has engendered a continuously evolving social 
unease, troubling different groups for different reasons at different 
times. But the underlying inquietude has persisted. At times, this 
discomfort has manifested itself through legal mechanisms-for 
example, as a statutory scheme designed to police the boundaries of 
racial classification based on blood quantum. At other times, the 
discomfort has emerged through direct social interaction-for 
example, as violence directed at interracial couples and at individuals 
viewed as racially mixed. 
Despite the historical and ongoing hostility to racial mixing, our 
legal system consistently fails to recognize racism directed at those 
seen as racially mixed. Race discrimination jurisprudence relies 
heavily on a familiar set of racial categories that David Hollinger has 
termed the "ethno-racial pentagon" of Asian, Latino/a, White, Black, 
and Native American. 2 Science has largely demonstrated that the 
1. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, 
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1172 (1997) (quoting 
WINTHROP D. jORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN AlTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 
1550-1812, at 166 (1968)). 
2. DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 23-25 
(1995). People tend to assert that "Latino/a" or "Hispanic" is an ethnicity rather 
than a race, or that it should be discussed as a different type of category than races 
such as "Black," "Asian," and so forth. See, e.g., Katherine Culliton-Gonzalez, Time to 
Revive Puerto Rican Voting Rights, 19 BERKELEY LA RAzA LJ. 27, 46-47 n.150 (2008) 
(explaining that "Hispanic" or "Latino" is generally a term describing ethnicity in the 
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boundaries of these crude categories are arbitrary and that the 
categories themselves are social constructs rather than biological 
realities.3 Nonetheless, the categories constitute the paradigm 
through which we view race. And antidiscrimination jurisprudence 
continues to reflect and reify those categories in recognizing and 
remedying claims of racial discrimination. 
This Article aims to expose the shortcomings of the prevailing 
crude racial categories as a means to implement the core provisions 
of antidiscrimination law-constitutional and statutory provisions 
such as the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, and the 
jurisprudence that has developed around these provisions. Such 
proVIsions are designed to address racial discrimination by 
prohibiting inequitable treatment of individuals based on race and by 
punishing such inequitable treatment when it occurs. The provisions 
are not intended to protect specific racial categories. Rather, 
categories are simply the mechanism that the judiciary has adopted 
for implementing the goals of our antidiscrimination regime. 
In light of these goals, I demonstrate that a categorical approach to 
race renders antidiscrimination jurisprudence inhospitable to claims 
brought by individuals who allege that they were discriminated 
against because they were perceived as multiracial.4 Categories 
United States and that Latinos can be of different races). The U.S. Census treats 
"Hispanic" as an ethnicity, asking respondents first to identify themselves as 
"Spanish/Hispanic/Latina" or non-Hispanic, and then asking separately what race 
they are. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census 
2000, Form D-61A, available at http:/ /www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d61a.pdf. 
I acknowledge that some have argued in favor of treating Latino/ a as other than a 
race. See, e.g., Juan Perea, Five Axioms in Search of Equality, 2 HARV.lATINO L. REv. 231, 
241 (1997) (arguing that ethnicity is a more appropriate categorization for Latinos 
for purposes of understanding discrimination because it encompasses aspects of race 
as well as characteristics such as language and history). Nonetheless, I believe that 
for purposes of this Article, it is more appropriate to adopt a functional definition of 
Latino/a. In the eyes of society, the label "Latino/a" functions similarly to the other 
four points on the ethno-racial pentagon; therefore, I refer to Latino/a as a race. 
See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the Mexican-
American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1268 (1997) (explaining that Latinos have 
been categorized as a race because of their perceived status as "foreigners" and their 
limitations in assimilation). 
3. See generally jOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL 
THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM (2001) (employing research in the field of 
human genetics to demonstrate the lack of scientific justification for regarding 
human populations as belonging to distinct racial groups); Ian F. Haney Lopez, 
The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 
29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 11-16 (1994) (noting that scientific data demonstrates 
that "greater genetic variation exists within the populations typically labeled Black 
and White than between these populations"). 
4. I use terms such as "mixed-race," "multiracial," and "biracial" throughout this 
Article, and I believe that it is critical to explain what I do and do not mean by these 
terms for purposes of my discussion. To some extent, the terms "multiracial" and 
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suppress ambiguity and stifle nuance, channeling plaintiffs who have 
suffered discrimination based on their perceived mixed ancestry into 
recognized monoracial narratives of discrimination. Courts' reliance 
on categories thus obscures racial animus specifically directed at 
those perceived as multiracial. Consequently, by relying on 
categories, courts blunt antidiscrimination law as a tool to promote 
racial understanding and eliminate racism. 
No scholarly work has previously focused on the treatment of 
individuals specifically identified as multiracial in antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence.5 The absence is surprising in light of the sheer 
volume of scholarship relating to multiracial individuals.6 
In discussing racial identities that transcend Hollinger's ethno-racial 
pentagon, scholars have generally focused on the problems related to 
recognizing and categorizing multiracial people. 7 Much research has 
"biracial" seem to rely on the idea of biological races: for someone to be multiracial, 
they must be a mixture of two "pure" races. Some scholars have thus criticized the 
use of the term "multiracial" as embracing an outdated biolo~cal view of race. 
See, e.g., RAINIER SPENCER, CHM.LENGING MULTIRACIAL IDENTI1Y 2 (2006) (associating 
the advocacy of multiracial identity with the belief "that biological race exists as a 
physical reality"). I explicitly renounce the notion that there is a biological basis for 
race. Rather, I view race as a socially constructed phenomenon. But my view does 
not render race a phenomenon undeserving of legal recognition. Some people are 
perceived by society either as racially mixed or as simultaneous members of two 
socially recognized monoracial groups. The fact that this socially perceived identity 
exists and exerts social force is the notion that I invoke in this Article when I use the 
word "multiracial." 
5. One scholar has mentioned discrimination against multiracial individuals in 
the larger context of arguing that focusing on the employer's discriminatory intent is 
a better test for Title VII claims than an immutable-trait analysis. See Ken Nakasu 
Davison, Note, The Mixed Race Experience: Treatment of Racially Miscategorized 
Individuals Under Title VII, 12 AsiAN LJ. 161 (2005). 
6. Indeed, several anthologies of such scholarship are currently in print. 
See, e.g., AMERICAN MIXED RACE: THE CULTURE OF MICRODIVERSilY (Naomi Zack ed., 
1995) (exploring identity theory as well as the personal, artistic, social science, and 
public policy implications of mixed race); THE MULTIRACIAL EXPERIENCE: RACIAL 
BORDERS AS THE NEW FRONTIER (Maria P. P. Root ed., 1996) (examining aspects of 
gender, education, and rights through the use of personal narratives); THE NEW RACE 
QUESTION: HOW THE CENSUS COUNTS MULTIRACIAL INDIVIDUALS (Joel Perlmann & 
Mary C. Waters eds., 2002) (analyzing the national policy implications of the census 
allowing respondents to choose their race); RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 
(Maria P. P. Rooted., 1992) (looking at issues involving categorization, multiracial 
children, and the census). 
7. See, e.g., SPENCER, supra note 4 (criticizing multiracial scholarship for 
bolstering traditional racial categories); RONALD R. SUNDSTROM, THE BROWNING OF 
AMERICA AND THE EVASION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (2008) (reflecting on shifting 
demographics and their impact on race theory and political philosophy); KIM M. 
WILLIAMS, MARK ONE OR MORE: CIVIL RIGHTS IN MULTIRACIAL AMERICA (2006) (noting 
various levels of recognition of multiracial interests according to factors such as total 
minority population and liberal/progressive tendencies of a state); Nancy A. Denton, 
Racial Identity and Census Categories: Can Incorrect Categories Yield Correct Information?, 
15 LAW & INEQ. 83 (1997) (articulating the importance of the difference between 
social and individual identity); Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the 
Color Line, 12 LAw & INEQ. 183 (1993) (recognizing the constant social and 
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examined the sense of disenfranchisement experienced by people 
who identify themselves as multiracial or as belonging to multiple 
racial categories.8 Scholars have explored the individual 
psychological harms that result from such racial alienation9 and have 
discussed whether demographic mechanisms, such as the census, 
should provide a forum for self-identified multiracial people to assert 
their self-perceived identities. 10 
While these issues are surely worthy of scholarly exploration, 
I believe that acknowledging animus directed at people whom others 
identify as multiracial is an urgent task fundamental to the project of 
situating multiracial people within a jurisprudence targeted at 
combating racism. Race matters in the first instance only because 
some people are treated differently-and worse-because of their 
race. Therefore, understanding how and why people who are viewed 
as racially mixed suffer racial discrimination should be the first step 
in theorizing how the legal system should regard such people. 
psychological questioning that multiracial individuals face); Tanya Kateri 
Hernandez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind 
jurisprudence, 57 Mo. L. REv. 97 (1998) (questioning the implementation of 
multiracial discourse in the quest for racial equality as hiding the racial impact of 
supposedly race-neutral laws); Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race 
and the National Imagination, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1701 (2003) (highlighting the efforts 
of mixed race individuals to gain recognition by the census and noting the 
interdependence of legal and cultural categories); John A. Powell, The Colorblind 
Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 789 (1997) 
(analyzing the limitations of colorblind and multiracial-position advocacy and 
acknowledging, instead, the different levels at which race operates); Kim Forde-
Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial 
Children, 92 MICH. L. REv. 925 (1994) (challenging the practice of racial-matching by 
courts and child-placement agencies, and arguing for a choice in the child's best 
interest). 
8. See, e.g., JUDY SCALEs-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, 
COMMUNITI' (1995) (providing insight through accounts of a mixed race woman 
often mistaken for a white woman); GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR 
LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995) 
(telling the story of a White boy who discovers that he has poor Black relatives who 
are passing as White);Johnson, supra note 2 (describing how multiracial individuals 
are marginalized or ignored and thus shut out of discourse); Adrian Piper, Passing for 
White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANSITION 4 (1992) (recounting how the author was 
isolated from both races because she was a light-skinned middle-class Black woman). 
9. See, e.g., Gilanshah, supra note 7, at 189-90 ("Multiracial individuals 
constantly confront sociological and psychological identity questions . . . . In 
general, multiracial people have problems coping with their marginal status."). 
10. See, e.g., THE NEW RACE QUESTION, supra note 6, at 40 ("When self-
identification is used to identify race . . . respondents should be given the 
opportunity to identify with more than one race, but the term 'multiracial' is not to 
be used. Rather, the names of specific races are to be presented as choices for the 
respondent."); Denton, supra note 7, at 92-96 (suggesting a two-question scheme 
regarding personal and social identification); Powell, supra note 7, at 794-95 
(identifying a discrepancy between how the government classifies groups compared 
to common usage). 
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Throughout this Article, I pass no judgment on who "is" or "is not" 
racially mixed. This approach is appropriate given my focus on 
discrimination, where the key question is not whether someone is in 
fact of a particular race, but rather whether a discriminator perceives 
that person to be a member of that race. Therefore, I employ an 
outsider's perspective in discussing racial identification. When I refer 
to "Asian people," for example, by default I mean people who are 
identified as Asian by other people (or by a specific other person). 
And when I refer to "multiracial people" or "mixed-race people," 
I mean those who are identified as multiracial. Determining whether 
mixed-race identification is "accurate" in any particular instance-or, 
indeed, defining what "accuracy" entails-is not my project here. 
Likewise, when I refer to an "interracial relationship," I mean a 
relationship between two people whom society views as members of 
different racial groups. Again, whether the individuals are "really" 
members of different races does not concern me. 
I clearly indicate the few instances where I depart from this "other-
identified" approach to racial identity. The departure is necessary 
because mixed-race self-identification has gained traction as a social 
phenomenon, and as a result, many Americans voluntarily identifY 
themselves as "mixed-race," "biracial," or "multiracial." This self-
identification is relevant to my project because a person who views 
herself as multiracial may choose to engage in a wide array of identity 
performance that leads other people also to identifY her as 
multiracial. Moreover, a plaintiff who identifies herself as multiracial 
and who claims discrimination on that basis may experience 
alienation if her narrative of discriminatory treatment is distorted by 
a court intent on conforming that narrative to a category-reliant 
jurisprudence. But identifYing oneself as multiracial is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to being identified as multiracial by others. 11 
So just as I need not pass judgment on whether outside identification 
of an individual as multiracial is accurate, I also need not pass 
judgment on whether an individual's self-identification as multiracial 
is accurate. 
Finally, I acknowledge color discrimination as an issue related to 
but distinct from multiracial discrimination. Because physical 
appearance is one characteristic by which society identifies people as 
mixed-race, undoubtedly skin color cues multiracial identification in 
some instances. But as I explain, physical appearance is not the only 
11. See Mezey, supra note 7, at 1753 ("People discriminate based on who they 
think you are and not how you understand yourself."). 
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characteristic by which an individual might come to be identified as 
racially mixed, nor will any particular physical trait automatically cue 
multiracial identification. Thus, race and color are not coextensive 
in the context of multiracial discrimination. An individual might 
suffer color discrimination even if others do not identifY him as 
multiracial. Likewise, he might suffer discrimination on the basis of 
multiracial identification regardless of the color of his skin.12 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly discusses the 
myriad ways by which people might come to identify an individual as 
racially mixed. Such identification might result from a number of 
cues, including physical appearance, language, speech, name, 
association with family members or friends, behavior, or any other 
factor that might be interpreted as a racial cue. I need not address 
whether such identification is "accurate" to conclude that the 
identification may engender tangible consequences for how the 
mixed-identified individual is treated. 
Part II then explores the phenomenon of animus against 
individuals perceived as racially mixed. I begin by summarizing the 
historical roots of animus against mixed-race people. Well into the 
twentieth century, both scientists and society at large generally agreed 
that mixed-race people were genetically inferior to "pure" members 
of all races. This consensus both flowed from and supported a 
generalized hostility toward racial mixing and multiracial people, and 
was instrumental in justifYing statutory prohibitions on miscegenation 
in many states. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia13 removed legal 
obstacles to interracial marriage, 14 and the subsequent increase in 
interracial unions laid the groundwork for the multiracial identity 
movement. That movement increased social awareness of individuals 
who identify themselves as multiracial or who are identified as such 
by others, and these individuals have been accorded a measure of 
legal recognition in certain contexts outside of the core provisions of 
antidiscrimination law. 15 But recent research indicates that many 
12. Future research might usefully interrogate the overlap and distinction 
between multiracial discrimination and color discrimination. 
13. 388 u.s. 1 (1967). 
14. /d. at 12 (holding that a prohibition of interracial marriage violated the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution). 
15. In some legal contexts, individuals who identify themselves as multiracial 
have succeeded in gaining acknowledgement that either they or society-or perhaps 
both-view traditional racial categories as inadequate to capture their racial identity. 
In what I refer to as the "diversity" context, a program is structured around the 
benefits that are believed to flow from the integration of people whom society 
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people still view interracial marriage-and, by extension, children 
born of such marriages-as undesirable. I conclude that animus 
against multiracial people persists today and results in tangible 
negative treatment of people viewed as multiracial. 
Part III examines the paucity of discrimination claims filed by 
individuals who are socially identified as racially mixed. This absence 
is surprising given the persistence of animus against those viewed as 
multiracial. As noted, antidiscrimination law is intended to ensure 
that individuals are not treated differently from one another on the 
basis of race, and the current jurisprudence interpreting those laws 
relies heavily on the existence of clear racial categories. Within this 
realm, plaintiffs who allege discrimination based on an ascribed non-
categorical identity remain largely unacknowledged. To the extent 
that the courts do acknowledge or accord protection to such 
plaintiffs, they generally skirt the non-categorical nature of the 
identity in question or they attempt to adapt the identity to conform 
to the prevailing categorical scheme. 
Part IV considers the troubling consequences of the phenomenon 
described in Part III. On an individual level, when a judicial actor 
revises a plaintiffs narrative of multiracial discrimination, that 
plaintiff suffers injury to his dignity and alienation from the legal 
system. Such revision also renders antidiscrimination jurisprudence 
inhospitable to claims by mixed-race individuals, making it difficult 
for an individual to succeed on a claim explicitly alleging multiracial 
discrimination. And on a broader social level, the suppression of 
non-categorical claims of discrimination leaves unaddressed the 
unique type of animus directed at multiracial individuals. 
For example, the discrimination suffered by an individual who has 
one Black and one White parent is not necessarily a subset of the 
discrimination directed at Black individuals or White individuals. 
Rather, the Black/White individual may suffer discrimination 
perceives as members of multiple racial categories. This justification applies to 
policies such as affirmative action and school redistricting. Some such programs 
allow individuals to identify as multiracial and to have their contribution to diversity 
assessed on that basis. And in what I refer to as the "demographic" context, a 
program involves governmental efforts to gather and retain statistical information 
about individual members of our population from which a variety of policy decisions 
and legal outcomes flow. The census is the obvious example of the demographic 
context, but various state data-gathering contexts and other governmental 
data-collection efforts also fall within this category. In some instances within this 
context, individuals are likewise given the opportunity to assert multiracial 
identification, either explicitly or by checking multiple boxes corresponding to racial 
classifications. Neither the diversity context nor the demographic context is the 
focus of this Article, but in both contexts, individuals who identify themselves as 
racially mixed have gained a measure of recognition. 
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precisely because he is perceived as racially mixed rather than as a 
"full" member of one category or the other. Courts' failure to 
recognize the possibility of discrimination specific to mixed-race 
individuals is self-perpetuating: a lack of precedent acknowledging 
multiracial discrimination decreases the likelihood that future 
decisions will acknowledge such discrimination. Moreover, this 
failure stifles awareness of multiracial discrimination and impedes an 
open discussion that might catalyze eradication of such forms of 
discrimination. And finally, courts' use of prevailing monoracial 
categories to remedy multiracial discrimination reifies the rigid 
monoracial categories as "true" and further entrenches them in social 
consciousness. 
In Part V, therefore, I offer a general outline for incorporating 
claims of discrimination by people identified as multiracial into 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. The framework I propose can 
readily be implemented under existing constitutional, statutory, and 
regulatory provisions; it neither contradicts existing jurisprudence 
nor does away with categories altogether. Rather, the framework 
would supplement current jurisprudence with a means to identify 
and remedy discrimination based on animus that does not fit easily 
into a category. I do not advocate for the recognition of a sixth 
category-"multiracial"-that would receive equal standing with the 
other five. Instead, I hope to show that courts may address racial 
discrimination without necessarily consigning the plaintiff to any of 
the conventional racial categories. My proposed framework would 
allow movement past our current racisms and toward a more 
nuanced understanding of the social construction of race-one in 
which racial identity is both fluid and contingent, and, to the extent 
that racial categories exist, they no longer bear the stigma associated 
with years past. 
I. "WHAT ARE You?"16: CUEING PERCEPTION OF RACIAL MIXING 
The view of race as a social rather than a biological phenomenon is 
not a recent development. More than twenty years ago, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged research positing that racial categories are 
invented social constructions: 
Many modern biologists and anthropologists ... criticize racial 
classifications as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the 
16. PEARL FUYO GASKINS, WHAT ARE You?: VOICES OF MIXED-RACE YOUNG PEOPLE 5 
(1999) ("As a racially mixed person, I have been asked ... 'What are you?' or 'Where 
are you from?' countless times by curious and sometimes obnoxious people .... "). 
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variability of human beings. It is said that genetically 
homogeneous populations do not exist and traits are not 
discontinuous between populations; therefore, a population can 
only be described in terms of relative frequencies of various traits. 
Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits which have 
generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as 
having little biological significance. It has been found that 
differences between individuals of the same race are often greater 
than the differences between the "average" individuals of different 
races. These observations and others have led some, but not all, 
scientists to conclude that racial classifications are for the most part 
sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature. 17 
Subsequent advances in scientific understanding have confirmed 
that race is, in fact, a social construction rather than a biological 
reality. 18 Because race is socially constructed, racial mixing is as well. 
Without the social perception that people belong to different racial 
categories, society would attach no particular label to the offspring of 
a relationship between supposed members of different races. 19 
But having parents who are members of different socially ascribed 
racial categories is neither necessary nor sufficient to one's 
identification as a multiracial person. Rather, many factors may lead 
to perception of an individual as racially mixed. I emphasize that 
such perception need not be "accurate"-whatever accuracy might 
entail-to result in tangible negative consequences for how the 
person viewed as multiracial is treated. Rather, the point is that 
various cues may lead one person to perceive another as multiracial, 
and that this labeling may alter the way the perceiver treats the 
multiracial-labeled person. 
An individual may come to be labeled as multiracial in two primary 
ways. The first consists of identification triggered solely or primarily 
by various physical traits or by an aggregation of those markers. 
Camille Rich offers a thorough analysis of the cognitive process of 
"morphology-based racial/ ethnic ascription," explaining that such 
ascription occurs when someone "interprets another person's visible, 
physical features to correlate with a set of features she identifies with 
a certain race or ethnic group."2° Features triggering racial ascription 
17. Saint Francis Coli. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,610 n.4 (1987). 
18. See sources cited supra note 3. 
19. Likewise, individuals would be unlikely to attach a "multiracial" label to 
themselves if their parents were not perceived as members of different races. 
20. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy 
and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1134, 1145 (2004) (identifying ascription 
of race and ethnicity as learned responses). 
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include skin color, hair texture, and nose or eye shape.21 Although 
most people believe that they can identify others' race or ethnicity 
based on morphology, in some instances, individuals are forced to 
acknowledge that morphology "fail[s] to provide a clear basis for 
identifying another person's race or ethnicity."22 In the aggregate, 
morphological markers may lead to an individual being seen as 
racially ambiguous-the kind of person of whom strangers often 
inquire, "What are you?" or perhaps, "What's your ancestry?" Many 
individuals, therefore, are identified as racially mixed based purely on 
their physical appearance.23 
Because genetic variance is unpredictable, not all people whose 
parents would be perceived as members of different socially 
constructed racial categories would themselves be perceived as 
mixed-race upon sight. Rather, such people are sometimes labeled as 
monoracial based on purely physical cues. 24 The second form of 
multiracial labeling, therefore, occurs when a person who is initially 
perceived as monoracial based on morphology comes to be perceived 
as multiracial-that is, when some other factor leads the perceiver to 
view the person as racially mixed. The perceiver's reaction in that 
instance is not "What are you?" but rather ''You're not what I thought 
you were." 
With respect to the second form of multiracial labeling, many 
factors other than physical appearance may trigger perception of an 
individual as mixed-race. An individual's style of speech-accent, 
vocabulary, syntax, and so on-may run counter to impressions 
created by that individual's physical appearance, perhaps leading to 
21. !d. at 1146. 
22. !d. at 114~8 (correlating increased human interaction with increased 
evidence of the limitations of morphology). 
23. The likelihood of an individual being labeled multiracial may be higher for 
some racial combinations than for others. Given America's ugly history of slave rape 
and hypodescent, I suspect that, in many instances, society instinctively labels 
Black/White individuals as Black even if they are relatively light-skinned and their 
other physical features tend to connote some degree of White ancestry. With respect 
to Asian/White individuals, I believe that there is more social iconography 
encouraging identification of such people as mixed. See, e.g., KIP FULBECK, PART 
AsiAN, 100% HAPA (2006) (featuring portraits and self-descriptions of individuals who 
identity themselves as racially mixed and Asian). I do not pursue this tentative 
conclusion further here, but perhaps it will provide interesting fodder for future 
research. 
24. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 1287 (suggesting that Latinos and African-
Americans with lighter complexions might have more choice regarding their 
asserted identity as opposed to being assigned a socially constructed race by others 
based on sight); Jean Shin, The Asian American Closet, 11 AsiAN LJ. 1, 3-4 (2004) 
(contending that stereotypes about assimilating Asians influence the physical erasure 
of multiracial individuals, including Keanu Reaves and Dean Cain, mixed-race actors 
who are regarded as white in the popular media). 
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the conclusion that the person is racially mixed. One study found 
that people are only seventy percent accurate at identifying others' 
race based solely on hearing their voices.25 While the study did not 
specify how the race of the participants was identified or how mixed-
race people were classified, its findings reinforce the notion that 
speech may influence perception of race. For example, if the 
perceiver initially forms an impression of someone's race based on a 
telephone conversation, that impression might be revised based on a 
subsequent in-person encounter. 
Language may likewise cue perception of an individual as 
multiracial. Perhaps an employee could pass as White but 
occasionally speaks Spanish in the workplace, either to other 
employees or to friends or relatives on the telephone within earshot 
of colleagues. That employee, while initially perceived by coworkers 
as White, might come to be perceived as multiracial. At the very least, 
the use of Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Swahili, or any other language 
might trigger questions that would lead to the bilingual individual 
"outing" herself as racially mixed by explaining that she learned the 
language in question from her parents or grandparents. 
An individual's first, middle, or last name may also cue mixed-race 
identification. Angela Onwuachi-Willig relates the story of a White 
friend named Nyasha who frequently encounters surprise when 
people meet her in person, having assumed, based on her name, that 
she was Black.26 Similarly, many mixed Asian children are given an 
Anglo first name and an Asian middle name by their parents. 
An employer who previously viewed a particular employee as White 
might consequently come to perceive him as multiracial after seeing 
his Asian middle name listed on company paperwork. I note that the 
inferences drawn from a name need not be accurate to cement an 
impression of a person as racially mixed. For example, were Nyasha's 
morphology sufficiently ambiguous, others might come to perceive 
her as partially Black based on her name and their interpretation of 
her morphology in light of her name. 
Association may also cue identification as mixed race. For 
example, in Mitchell v. Champs Sports,27 the plaintiff testified that her 
25. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
"Regarded As" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 
2005 Wrs. L. REv. 1283, 1308-09 (2005). This study was one of a series of phonetic 
experiments examining the correlation of perception of speech and discrimination. 
See Thomas Purnell et al., Perceptual and Phonetic Experiments on American English Dialect 
Identification, 18]. LANGUAGE&SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 11, 19-22 (1999). 
26. Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 25, at 1301 n. 72. 
27. 42 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Tex. 1998). 
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mother was White and that her father was Black, but based on her 
appearance, "many people consider her of mixed Hispanic and 
European descent."28 However, the plaintiff was often visited at the 
store where she worked by Black friends and relatives, and her 
treatment by her supervisor rapidly deteriorated after he observed 
these visits and identified her as a person with Black ancestry.29 
Likewise, an employee's marriage to or partnership with a person 
perceived to belong to a particular race may lead to a perception that 
the employee is racially mixed-i.e., that he is a "partial" member of 
his partner's ascribed race. This is particularly likely if he makes his 
relationship visible by introducing his partner to his coworkers or by 
displaying pictures of his partner on his desk. Indeed, even a 
superficially insignificant associative act, such as an employee's 
decision to eat lunch with a group of employees whose ascribed race 
is inconsistent with his own physical appearance, may trigger 
multiracial identification. 
Additionally, any number of behaviors may lead others to view an 
individual as mixed-race.3° For example, a man who appears White in 
the eyes of society might list membership in an Asian Pacific 
American student organization on his resume, thereby inducing an 
employer to perceive him as part-Asian.31 A relatively fair-skinned 
woman with kinky hair might restyle her hair in cornrows, causing 
her boss to view her as part-Black. An olive-skinned, Spanish-
speaking man with the surname "Ramirez" may announce his intent 
to visit his mother's side of the family in Japan, triggering 
assumptions-or at least questions-about whether his mother is 
Asian. The extent to which an individual intentionally engages in 
behavior designed to promote a certain perception of his racial 
background is a rich and fascinating topic. Devon Carbado and Mitu 
Gulati have examined the incentives to perform racial identity in a 
certain way-to "work identity"-and the consequences of that 
performance.32 While I believe that this topic is important and 
28. /d. at 646. 
29. Id. 
30. See generally Rich, supra note 20, at 1139-44 (discussing various behaviors and 
other forms of self-presentation as racial signifiers). 
31. Judy Scales-Trent describes the experience of "hav[ing] been at social 
gatherings where I did not know a certain person was 'black' until they dropped 
verbal markers into the conversation ('Are you a Delta too?')." SCALEs-TRENT, supra 
note 8, at 89. 
32. See, e.g., Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 
1259 (2000) (exploring how the ways in which "workplace outsiders" perform their 
racial and ethnic identities affects others' perceptions and the treatment that the 
"workplace outsiders" receive). 
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deserving of close examination, for present purposes, it will suffice to 
posit intentional identity performance, or identity work, as another 
mechanism by which an individual might come to be perceived as 
racially mixed. 
I cannot overemphasize the role of the perceiver in multiracial 
identification. With respect to any non-physical factor-speech, 
language, name, association, and other behavior-the perceiver's 
recognition of the potential cue may also cause the perceiver to 
become more attentive to certain physical traits that, correctly or 
incorrectly, cue a designation of racial mixedness in the perceiver's 
mind. Relatedly, the way in which an individual is labeled based 
purely on physical appearance may depend on external factors, such 
as geography, or on the background and life experiences of the 
person doing the labeling. For example, someone who would likely 
be perceived as a multiracial Asian/White person in San Francisco, 
California, where Asian/White intermarriage is relatively common, 
might simply be perceived as Asian in Charleston, West Virginia, 
where there are relatively few Asians, let alone intermarriages 
between Asians and Whites.33 The non-physical cues I have 
enumerated may likewise take on different significance to different 
perceivers. For example, Camille Rich has discussed how a manner 
of speaking that tends to be perceived as a Black dialect in the 
Northeast may simply connote low socioeconomic status in the 
South.34 
The perception of an individual as multiracial is fluid and 
contingent, and such perception depends significantly on the 
perceiver's situation and past experiences. Thus, we must focus on 
the perceiver's perspective in examining multiracial labeling and how 
such labeling may lead to discrimination. The next Part, then, takes 
this perspective in examining how, once a person has come to be 
perceived as racially mixed or otherwise outside of traditional racial 
categories, that perception sometimes triggers animus on the part of 
the perceiver. Emphasizing the perceiver's perspective, I discuss the 
historical roots of multiracial animus and its persistence in society 
today. 
33. The 2000 Census reported that 30.8% of San Franciscans were Asian, 
compared to only 1.8% of Charleston's population. U.S. Census Bureau, American 
FactFinder, http:/ /factfinder.census.gov (enter "san francisco" and "california" in 
"Fast Access to Information" fields; follow "San Francisco city, California" hyperlink; 
select "2000" tab; repeat search for "charleston" and "west virginia") (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2010). 
34. Rich, supra note 20, at 1158. 
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II. "A MONGREL BREED OF CITIZENS"35: ANIMUS AGAINST 
MULTIRACIAL PEOPLE 
One might argue that discrimination against multiracial people is 
merely a subset-perhaps even a milder one-of discrimination 
against monoracial individuals. In other words, a person who is 
identified as partially Black might be subject to the same kind of 
animus as one who is identified as fully Black. This Part aims to 
disprove that notion and demonstrate that animus against people 
identified as multiracial is a unique phenomenon. 
I readily acknowledge some overlap between what we might call 
monoracial and multiracial animus: a racist who dislikes people who 
she views as Asian might well dislike an individual whom she 
identifies as part-Asian for some of the same reasons. But viewing 
someone as part-Asian also lends itself to unique forms of animus not 
directed at those perceived as monoracial. A mixed-race person may 
be viewed as polluted, defective, confusing or confused, passing, 
threatening, or-in our diversity-obsessed society-as opportunistic, 
gaining an advantage by identifying with a group in which he is at 
best a partial member. These negative associations may be 
distinguished from those directed at people perceived as monoracial. 
I use history, sociology, and jurisprudence to buttress my claim that 
animus against multiracial people is a unique form of animus that is 
distinguishable from animus directed at any monoracial group. 
In the process, I hope to demonstrate that animus against racially 
mixed individuals is anything but benign or mild. 
Other scholars have attempted to illuminate the reason underlying 
the persistent discomfort with racial mixing and racial mixedness.36 
My own view is that different groups' discomfort with mixing is so 
heterogeneous that any theory attempting to explain animus toward 
multiracial people will by necessity be quite complicated. While I 
believe that development of such a theory is an important project, it 
is one I do not address in this Article. Instead, I focus on 
demonstrating that racism directed at people who are viewed as 
35. See Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749,756 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) 
(per curiam). 
36. See, e.g., SCALEs-TRENT, supra note 8, at 57-59 (discussing incidents during 
which her distinctly mixed-race physical appearance "upset [people] because there 
was not a good fit between what they saw and heard, and what they expected to see 
and hear"); Piper, supra note 8, at 7 (asserting that "perceptual and cognitive 
distortions" result from "the failure to see any act of racist aggression as a defensive 
response to one's own perceived attack on the aR,gressor's physical or psychological 
property, or conception of himself or of the world ) . 
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multiracial is a real phenomenon that may result in tangible negative 
consequences to the lives of the people thus identified. 
A. Historical Origins 
Hostility toward people perceived as racially mixed has a long 
pedigree in American society and is intricately interwoven with 
disapproval of interracial relationships. For many years, racial mixing 
between Black and White individuals was the most salient form of 
mixing due to the history of slavery, and the ongoing tension 
between Black and White communities yielded heightened animosity 
toward Black/White mixed individuals. This focus on Black/White 
mixing was reflected and reinforced by contemporaneous social 
science research. As a result, the academic literature contains a more 
thorough examination of Black/White relationships than 
relationships involving other races. 
While I, too, acknowledge the importance of Black/White mixing, 
and while I begin my historical discussion with that relationship, 
I emphasize that hostility to racial mixing and mixed-race individuals 
was also directed at relationships between Whites and Native 
Americans; that such hostility expanded to include Asians and 
Latinos as they entered the country; and that such hostility was by no 
means limited to relationships in which one partner was White. 
Animus toward these other instances of racial mixing has, in my view, 
received insufficient acknowledgment as a complement to the 
Black/White narrative. While I therefore do my best in this Section 
to examine thematically the hostility toward racial mixing among 
members of all races, my efforts are somewhat limited by the 
prevalence of scholarship related to the Black/White paradigm. 
Likewise, my purpose is to provide a conceptual overview rather than 
a comprehensive account: other scholars have explored the history 
of animus toward racial mixing-at least with respect to Black/White 
relationships-in considerable detail, which I do not replicate here.37 
Well into the beginning of the twentieth century, prevailing science 
demonized racial mixing between Blacks and Whites as undesirable 
and even dangerous. Herbert Hovenkamp draws a fine distinction 
between two strains of social scientific thought regarding such racial 
37. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS 
AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); INTERRACIALISM: BlACK-
WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, LITERATURE AND LAW (Werner Solloers 
ed., 2000); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). 
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mixing.38 The first emphasized the role of God in creating different 
races, invoking so-called natural law to predict that "ugly 
consequences" would result from "any tampering-such as the 
interbreeding of dissimilar organisms."39 The second strain of 
thought, which gradually came to predominate, was driven by 
evolutionists who emphasized the role of genetics.40 These 
"hereditary determinists" argued that racial mixing would "slow the 
evolutionary progress of the more advanced race" and would 
"increase[] the possibility of producing bizarre, unhealthy offspring . 
. . with disproportioned features, mental deficiency, weakness, and 
disease."41 
Indeed, the attitude that racially mixed individuals were defective 
undergirded the legal prohibitions on miscegenation.42 Prominent 
social scientists agreed that the "mulatto" was physically, 
intellectually, and psychologically inferior to both Black and White 
individuals. For example, Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, a well-known 
professor at Harvard at the turn of the twentieth century, noted that 
mulattos are "general [ly] of feeble vitality, rarely surviving beyond 
middle age,"43 and that they possessed "a refinement unfitting [them] 
for all work which has not a certain delicacy about it" as well as "a 
laxity of morals."44 Shaler's colleagues echoed these views.45 
Hovenkamp summarizes the views of Shaler and his contemporaries: 
"[T] he mulatto was an outcast in both worlds-too civilized to be 
comfortable with the black, but too primitive to live with the white 
without giving offense."46 
These views were reflected in popular opinion. In Rhinelander v. 
Rhinelander,41 perhaps the most sensational case involving 
miscegenation, a wealthy white man sought an annulment of his 
marriage on the ground of fraud after learning that his wife had 
38. Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DuKE 
LJ. 624,634 (1985). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. I d. at 634-35. 
42. See Gilanshah, supra note 7, at 193-94 (explaining that court decisions often 
contained rationales that expressed fear and anxiety over the possibility of interracial 
relationships weakening the overall population, often using "pseudo-scientific myths" 
and religious beliefs). 
43. N. S. Shaler, Our Negro Types, 29 CURRENT LITERATURE 45,46 (1900). 
44. N. S. Shaler, An Ex-Southerner in South Carolina, ATL. MoNTHLY, July 1870, at 
53, 57. 
45. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 654-55. 
46. Id. at 655. 
47. 219 N.Y.S. 548 (App. Div. 1927). 
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"colored blood."48 His attorney-a well-known and successful 
member of the bar-exhorted the jury to find in his client's favor, 
urging: "[T]here isn't a father among you [the jury members] who 
would rather not see his son in his casket than to see him wedded to a 
mulatto woman .... Decent blacks have the same feeling." 49 While 
the jury ultimately found against the husband, the fact that a highly 
regarded attorney conceived this argument attests to the contempt 
with which many Whites viewed "mulattos"; moreover, the same 
attitudes toward those perceived as racially mixed were imputed to 
"decent blacks." 
Contemporaneous accounts of attitudes toward Mexican-American 
immigrants reflect a similar disparaging attitude toward racial 
mixture. Juan Perea has described the general contempt for the 
"mongrel race" of Mexican immigrants. 50 Indeed, well into the 
twentieth century, "American visitors to the Mexican frontier were 
nearly unanimous in commenting on the dark skin of Mexican 
mestizos who, it was generally agreed, had inherited the worst 
qualities of Spaniards and Indians to produce a 'race' still more 
despicable than that of either parent."51 The focus, therefore, was on 
the inferiority specifically produced by perceived racial mixing. 
As Guadalupe Luna likewise documents, early twentieth-century texts 
link immigrants' racially mixed heritage and their perceived 
intellectual and social shortcomings.52 In 1927, one author 
explained: "The Mexican 'peon' (Indian or mixed-breed) is a 
poverty-stricken, ignorant, primitive creature, with strong muscles 
and with just enough brains to obey orders and produce profits 
under competent direction."53 
Statutory law reflected this condemnation of racial mixing. 
Scholars have documented the long history of anti-miscegenation 
48. I d. at 549. 
49. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. 
Rhinelander as a Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CAL. L. 
REv. 2393, 2418, 2436 (2007) (citations omitted) (providing a detailed account of 
the Rhinelander case while drawing on primary sources). 
50. Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 965, 975-77 (1995). 
51. Id. at 976 (quoting FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF 
THE MEXICAN AMERICANS 59-60 (David]. Weber ed., 1973) ). 
52. See Guadalupe T. Luna, ''Agricultural Underdogs" and International Agreements: 
The Legal Context of Agricultural Worker.s Within the Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. REv. 9, 9 
(1996) (introducing the article's analysis of agricultural inequality by quoting early 
literature that traced racial inequality to the intersection of socioeconomic status and 
ethnicity). 
53. Id. (quoting LOTHROP STODDARD, RE-FORGING AMERICA: THE STORY OF OUR 
NATIONHOOD 214 (1927) ). 
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statutes in America, beginning with statutes in Maryland and Virginia 
in the 1660s.54 At one point, thirty-eight states had statutes banning 
miscegenation,55 and more than half of all states had retained these 
statutes as of 1955.56 Virginia's statute, passed in 1924 and titled 
"An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity," provides a typical example 
demonstrating a desire to prevent racial mixing. 57 
Moreover, even when the law did not explicitly condemn racial 
mixing, it served as a tool to monitor interracial relationships. 
The census and other governmental mechanisms for statistical data 
collection reveal a preoccupation with what Naomi Mezey and 
Tseming Yang have described as "policing" racial identity claims.58 
The intensely detailed racial classification system on census forms, 
which at one point included categories such as "Quadroon" and 
"Octoroon," reflected a preoccupation with monitoring the number 
and "type" of mixed race individuals with (what was perceived as) 
scientific precision.59 
Against this backdrop of explicit prohibition of miscegenation and 
more generalized racial monitoring, courts repeatedly upheld 
statutes designed to prevent interracial interaction. Plessy v. Ferguson60 
was, of course, the seminal case, upholding "the separation of the two 
races" specifically with respect to public railway cars while also 
indicating that such separation was broadly constitutional in a variety 
of contexts.61 Underlying the notion of "separate but equal" was 
54. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW66-67 (3d ed. 1992). 
55. /d. at 67 (citing Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional 
and Social Problem, 53 GEO. LJ. 49, 50 (1964) ). 
56. Trinajones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE LJ. 1487, 1512 
(2000). 
57. Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 371, § 4, 1924 Va. Acts 534-35 (providing that a 
couple could not receive a marriage license until the state verified that each 
applicant's race was pure and that it matched the other individual's race). 
58. See Naomi Mezey, supra note 7, at 1755 (framing the debate over who should 
administer the census in terms of "protect[ing] a particular vision of the group 
against attack from both within and without"); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and 
Cultural Identity: Reconciling the jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 IND. LJ. 119, 154 
(1997) (noting the clash between the state's regulatory judgment and one's right to 
"define one's own conception of the self'). 
59. In 1870, for instance, the instructions to census enumerators cautioned: 
"Be particularly careful in reporting the class Mulatto. The word is here generic, and 
includes quadroons, octoroons, and all persons having any perceptible trace of 
African blood. Important scientific results depend upon the correct determination 
of this class .... " See C. Matthew Snipp, Racial Measurement in the American Census: 
Past Practices and Implications for the Future, 29 ANN. REv. Soc. 563, 566--67 (2003) 
(quoting U.S. BUREAU CENSUS, TwEN1Y CENSUSES: POPULATION AND HOUSING 
QUESTIONS 1790-1980, at 18 (1979). 
60. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
61. /d. at 550-51 (referring to the constitutionality of mandating racial 
segregation in "public conveyances" generally). 
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anxiety about the potential consequences of social interaction across 
racial lines, which might in turn lead to interracial relationships and 
marriage. 62 Given the legislature's power to control marriage as a 
vital institution central to social order, courts generally agreed that 
the legislature reasonably exercised that power to prevent 
undesirable interracial relationships and the defective offspring such 
unions were believed to produce. 
Several cases exemplify this form of judicial reasoning. For 
example, in Berea College v. Commonwealth,63 the highest court in 
Kentucky upheld the imposition of a $1000 fine on a private school 
for operating a racially integrated institution in violation of a state 
statute.64 The court held that "to assert separateness is not to declare 
inferiority in either [race] . . . . It is simply to say that following the 
order of Divine Providence, human authority ought not to compel 
these widely separate races to intermix."65 Likewise, in Naim v. Naim, 66 
a case involving a White woman and a Chinese man, the Virginia 
Supreme Court upheld the state's anti-miscegenation statute in order 
"to preserve the racial integrity of [the state's] citizens."67 The court 
emphasized the need to prevent "the corruption of blood" and 
foreclose the genesis of "a mongrel breed of citizens."68 
Similar concerns are evident in cases revoking citizenship from 
White women who married men ineligible for naturalization-
primarily Asian men-based on legislation such as the Expatriation 
Act of 190769 and the Cable Act of 1922.70 While comprehensively 
documenting these events, Leti Volpp explores the marriage between 
Mary Das, a White woman descended from a Mayflower passenger, 
and Taraknath Das, a prominent Indian independence activist 
residing in the United States.71 While Taraknath Das successfully 
62. See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 634 (describing anxiety over interactions 
across racial lines as grounded in either a creationist or evolutionist world view). 
63. 94 S.W. 623 (Ky. 1906), afj'd, 211 U.S. 45,58 (1908). 
64. /d. at 623-24. 
65. /d. at 628. 
66. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam). 
67. /d. at 756. 
68. /d. 
69. Ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 (revoking citizenship from women of any race 
who married male non-citizens). 
70. Ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022 (ending expatriation of women who married 
men eligible for citizenship while maintaining expatriation for women who married 
men ineligible for naturalization); see Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian 
American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 
432-34 (2005) (explaining that the Cable Act only ended expatriation for marriages 
between Blacks and Whites, but had no effect on Asian-American women who had 
married men ineligible for naturalization). 
71. See Volpp, supra note 70, at 435-36. 
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naturalized in 1914, his citizenship was revoked after the Supreme 
Court found that Indians were not "white" for purposes of 
citizenship72-leading to the revocation of Mary Das's citizenship as 
well.73 
Finally, the prohibition against miscegenation even extended 
overseas. During World War II, Black American soldiers stationed in 
Europe often had greater opportunity to interact and develop 
romantic relationships with White European women. Nonetheless, 
commanding officers continued to deny Black troops permission to 
marry their European fiancees if their marriages would violate anti-
miscegenation statutes in the United States.74 
The distaste for multiracial people I have so far discussed is 
principally that of a White ruling class concerned with the dilution of 
its racial purity and the disruption of the society it controlled. 
As I have mentioned, my discussion is a byproduct of the fact that this 
White ruling class was the primary producer of scientific thought, 
statutory provisions, and judicial decisions. But members of other 
racial groups, though lacking the same access to power structures, 
were not immune to the view that racial mixing would lead to 
defective offspring or dilute the desirable properties of their own 
race. Cornel West, for example, discusses Malcolm X's antipathy 
toward cultural mixing. 75 West explains that in the context of a 
culture of White oppression and Black subordination, Malcolm X 
viewed "mulattoes[] as symbols of weakness and confusion."76 
Paradoxically, while historically many individuals believed that 
multiracial people were socially inferior to members of "pure" races, 
the reverse perception also inspired animus. Mixed-race people 
experienced dislike from disadvantaged racial groups based upon the 
perceived greater social options available to those who could claim 
mixed ancestry. This animus is related to antipathy toward the 
practice of "passing"-holding oneself out, explicitly or implicitly, as 
a member of a different race. 77 Historically, perhaps the most 
72. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1923) ("It is a matter of 
familiar observation and knowledge that the physical group characteristics of the 
Hindus render them readily distinguishable from the various groups of persons in 
this country commonly recognized as white."). 
73. Volpp, supra note 70, at 435-36. 
74. ALEX LUBIN, ROMANCE AND RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 
1945-1954, at 101 (2005). 
75. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 103 (1993). 
76. /d. 
77. See Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 1145, 1145 (2001) 
(clarifYing that "passing" is a voluntary act, different from the situation in which an 
individual is told he is one race when he would be considered something else if his 
actual ancestry were disclosed). 
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common form of passing in America involved light-skinned Blacks-
often the descendants of White slave masters and Black slaves-
passing for White in order to improve their economic opportunities 
and social standing.78 Predictably, White supremacists objected to 
passing because it threatened notions of racial purity. 79 But many 
Blacks also objected to passing, arguing that passing was a "betrayal" 
of "racial loyalty" to the Black community and that passers become 
"complicit in the regimes that they attempt to escape."80 
The negative reactions to passing relate closely to racial mixing, as 
those who engaged in passing often were also perceived as racially 
mixed. For example, the selection of light-skinned Homer Plessy, 
who was seven-eighths White, to serve as the plaintiff in a challenge to 
Virginia's "Separate Car Law" provoked resentment from some 
members of the Black community on the ground that the challenge 
would represent only the interests of lighter-skinned mulattos and 
was therefore "an attempt by mulattos to retain the privileges that 
their light skin had previously afforded."81 Light-skinned Blacks 
experienced hostility even when they did not fully pass. As Trina 
Jones has explained, in the early 1900s, "[a]lthough the mulatto elite 
were generally in a higher socioeconomic class than unmixed Blacks 
due to their historically favored status ... their lighter skin and better 
socioeconomic status spawned resentment within the Black 
community."82 Racial mixedness thus engendered animus from both 
advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups. 
Ultimately, courts invalidated legal prohibitions against racial 
mtxmg. In 1948, in Perez v. Sharp,83 the California Supreme Court 
struck down the state's anti-miscegenation statute in the face of a 
challenge brought by a Latina woman and a Black man.84 And in 
1967, the Supreme Court followed suit in Loving v. Virginia, holding 
that statutes prohibiting miscegenation were unconstitutional on the 
ground that they violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.85 Now, more than four decades after that decision, one 
78. /d. at 1157. 
79. /d. at 1157-58 (noting that the threat focused mostly on an unsuspecting 
White person marrying a Black person "passing" as White). 
80. /d. at 1158, 1175. 
81. Mark Golub, Plessy as "Passing": Judicial Responses to Ambiguously Raced Bodies 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 39 LAw & Soc'vREv. 563, 563, 571 (2005). 
82. Jones, supra note 56, at 1517; see also id. at 1518-21 (documenting the various 
ways in which "the dominant preference operates in favor of lighter skin tones" 
among Blacks, just as it does among Whites). 
83. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
84. /d. at 29 (holding that California's miscegenation law was too vague to be 
enforced and that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
85. 388 u.s. 1, 12 (1967). 
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might hope that animus against mixed-race people would be virtually 
nonexistent, particularly in an era when multiracial people and 
families appear regularly on our movie screens and televisions and 
when our forty-fourth president is the son of a Black man from Kenya 
and a White woman from Kansas.86 Surely social attitudes have 
evolved toward tolerance, but Loving and the other race-related civil 
rights gains of the 1960s have not fully dissipated animus against 
those identified as racially mixed. The next Section discusses the 
continuing discomfort with interracial relationships and the offspring 
of such relationships. 
B. Contemporary Attitudes 
The phenomenon now known as the multiracial identity 
movement has undoubtedly shaped our current attitudes toward 
racial mixing and multiracial people. Two events paved the way for 
this movement. The first was the Loving decision, described above, 
which removed legal obstacles to intermarriage between individuals 
of different races.Hi The other event was the decision of the Bureau 
of the Census to discontinue the practice of having a census 
enumerator visually determine the races of people surveyed in the 
census.
88 In 1960, the Bureau instead began to ask the head of the 
household to fill out the census form. 89 To governmental 
demographers, race thus became a feature of how an individual 
(or, at least, the head of the individual's household) perceived 
himself, rather than a product of how outsiders (such as census 
enumerators) perceived that individual. 
These two events-the Loving decision and the census 
modification-laid the groundwork for the multiracial identity 
movement. Reynolds Farley has noted that, "[a]s early as the 
1950s, married interracial couples had organized clubs in Detroit, 
Los Angeles, and New York to support one another and their mixed-
86. Interestingly, Barack Obama is not the first president to claim racially mixed 
ancestry. Bill Clinton also described himself as a "multiracial American" because 
some of his ancestors were Native American. Reynolds Farley, Racial Identities in 
2000: The Response to the Multiple-Race Response Option, in THE NEW RACE QUESTION, 
supra note 6, at 37. 
87. For example, post-Loving, the number of Black/White married couples living 
in the United States increased over 600% in less than twenty years, with the number 
of Black/White offspring increasing more than seven-fold between 1968 and 1994. 
Patrick F. Linehan, Thinking Outside of the Box: The Multiracial Category and Its 
Implications for Race Identity Development, 44 How. LJ. 43, 47-48 (2000). 
88. See Snipp, supra note 59, at 569 (explaining that the role of the census 
enumerator was reduced after a large undercounting of minority populations was 
discovered). 
89. /d. 
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race children."90 But multiracial identity groups first gained broader 
recognition as a social movement in the 1970s and 1980s. A group 
called Interracial Intercultural Pride ("1-Pride") formed in the 1970s 
"to convince the Berkeley public schools to include an 'interracial' 
category on official forms.'m The Association of MultiEthnic 
Americans, which was created from an alliance of 1-Pride and several 
other grassroots organizations, also increasingly lobbied for political 
and legal recognition.!12 In 1988, an Atlanta woman who objected to 
the Georgia public school system's classification of her children and 
other mixed-raced children solely as Black, regardless of their 
preferences or their parents' preferences, formed an organization 
called ReclassifY All Children Equally.93 Several other multiracial 
advocacy groups subsequently emerged.94 
By 1990, although the census still instructed people to check one 
box that best described their race, over half a million people 
explicitly disobeyed these instructions by picking two or more races.90 
In 1992, nearly 400 multiracial and biracial individuals attended the 
"Loving Conference," which was "the first national gathering of the 
multiracial community."96 Although the multiracial identity 
movement failed to induce the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget to include a "multiracial" category on the 2000 census, that 
census did, for the first time, allow individuals to select more than 
one racial category to describe themselves.97 Multiracial individuals 
have also received legislative attention at the state level,98 and the 
number of self-identified multiracial people continues to increase.99 
90. Farley, supra note 86, at 34. 
91. See Mezey, supra note 7, at 1749 (noting that while !-Pride successfully forced 
the change in Berkley public schools, the state refused to use a classification system 
that conflicted with the federal system). 
92. I d. The founder of this organization, a San Francisco attorney who identified 
as both White and Mexican, even considered filing suits about the single-race 
classification system on the 1990 census but was unable to locate qualified plaintiffs. 
Farley, supra note 86, at 34-35. 
93. Farley, supra note 86, at 34. 
94. See id. at 35 (highlighting mixed-race support groups such as "A Place for Us," 
the "Brick by Brick Church," the "Interracial Family Alliance," and the "Interracial 
Lifestyle Connection"). 
95. Wendy D. Roth, The End of the One-Drop Rule? Labeling of Multiracial Children 
in Black Intermarriages, 20 Soc. F. 35, 38 (2005). 
96. Gilanshah, supra note 7, at 183-84. 
97. Joel Perlmann & Mary C. Waters, Introduction to THE NEW RACE QUESTION, 
supra note 6, at 1. 
98. Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio all have passed 
multiracial category legislation. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-135 (1994) (requiring a 
multiracial category on state forms used for reporting racial data to federal 
agencies); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3.111 (West 2006) (requiring a multiracial 
category on all forms used by the State Board of Education to gather data relating to 
racial categories); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-15-5.1-6.5 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring a 
2010] JUDICIAL ERASURE OF MIXED-RACE DISCRIMINATION 493 
Despite the multiracial identity movement, animus toward people 
perceived as racially mixed lingers in society and, indeed, has 
mutated to take on new forms. As previously discussed, attitudes 
toward multiracial people are linked to perceptions of interracial 
relationships. Although one might hypothesize a racist who 
vehemently opposes interracial relationships but has no problem with 
the offspring of those relationships, in practice, the coexistence of 
such attitudes seems unlikely. A more plausible notion is that the 
multiracial person is targeted for disapproval for reasons similar to 
the reasons that motivate disapproval of interracial relationships. 
As detailed below, the fact that many Americans continue to view 
such relationships with suspicion and disapproval is indicative of how 
those same Americans view multiracial individuals. 
Polling indicates that reservations regarding interracial 
relationships linger. For example, a 2007 study by the Pew Institute 
found that eighty-three percent of a representative sample of 
Americans agreed with the statement: "[I]t's all right for blacks and 
whites to date." 100 Therefore, by logical extension, seventeen percent 
of the population has some sort of reservation about Blacks and 
Whites dating, let alone marrying and having children. Another Pew 
study conducted in March 2008 asked a representative sample of 
White Democrats whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement: It's "[a]ll right for blacks and whites to date each other." 
Thirteen percent of study participants stated that they "disagree[d] "; 
twenty-four percent stated that they "mostly agree[d]"; and sixty-one 
multiracial category for some forms used by public agencies); MD. CODE ANN., STATE 
Gov'T, § 10-606(c) (2) (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring a multiracial category for any 
form that requires identification of individuals by race); MICH. COMP. LAws SERV. 
§ 37.2202a (LexisNexis 2001) (requiring public agency forms that request racial 
information to include a multiracial category); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.941 
(LexisNexis 2009) (requiring a multiracial category on forms that collect racial data). 
Florida and North Carolina have administratively mandated a multiracial category, 
and legislators have introduced multiracial category bills in California, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and Texas. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 65. 
99. One projection suggest~ that by 2050, 17.8% of the population will be of 
mixed ancestry-a figure that includes 87.8% of "American Indians," 27.6% of 
"Asians and Pacific Islanders," 22.7% of "African Americans," 45.4% of "Hispanics," 
and 19.1% of "Whites." Barry Edmonston et al., Recent Trends in Intermarriage and 
Immigration and Their Effects on the future Racial Composition of the U.S. Papulation, in 
THE NEW RAcE QUESTION, supra note 6, at 246--47 tbl.9.8. The same projection 
predicts that by 2100, 34.2% of the total population will be of mixed ancestry. !d. 
100. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, The Databank, 83%-Approve 
Interracial Dating, http:/ I pewresearch.org/ databank/ dailynumber /?NumberiD=285 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009). 
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percent "completely agree[d]." 101 While a majority of respondents 
therefore expressed no concern about interracial dating, the survey 
nonetheless indicates that more than one-third of self-identified 
White Democrats have at least some hesitation about dating 
relationships between Blacks and Whites (let alone relationships 
involving marriage and children) and are willing to say so to a phone 
surveyor. 
Likewise, a 2001 survey of interracial couples found that, while the 
majority felt that their relationship was accepted by their families and 
friends, many couples believed that marrying someone of a different 
race makes marriage more difficult. 102 Indeed, sixty-five percent of 
couples in Black/White partnerships and twenty-four percent of 
Asian/White and Latino/White couples said that at least one set of 
parents initially objected to the relationship. 103 In a companion 
survey, nearly half of the White individuals surveyed stated that it was 
"b " c 1 f th . 104 Th etter 1.0r peop e to marry someone o e1r own race. us, 
regardless of the precise numbers, these surveys demonstrate that 
many Americans retain some level of discomfort with the notion of 
racial mixing. 
This antipathy toward interracial relationships mirrors the hostility 
directed at people viewed as racially mixed. 105 The sheer number of 
slurs specifically designated for multiracial individuals attests to such 
animus. 106 While it is unnecessary to catalog each permutation of 
perceived racial mixing and the specific hostility it engenders, 
I discuss some of the common themes and provide a few examples of 
how these themes play out in specific communities. 
101. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Obama Weathers the Wright 
Storm, Clinton Faces Credibility Problem, Mar. 27, 2008, http:/ /people-
press.org/ report/?pageid=1281. 
102. Darryl Fears & Claudia Deane, Biracial Couples Report Tolerance, WASH. POST, 
July 5, 2001, at Al. 
103. !d. 
104. !d. 
105. I note that people who experience hostility because they are viewed as 
multiracial may also experience hostility because they are viewed as monoracial. 
For example, someone who is subject to hostility as a biracial Black/White person 
might also be subject to hostility as a White person from Black people and as a Black 
person from White people. See Piper, supra note 8, at 6-7 (decrying the experience 
of having Blacks transfer their hostility from recent experiences with racist Whites to 
the author as a Black who looked White). While my focus is on discrimination 
against those viewed as multiracial, these other motivations for discrimination may 
provide an additional gloss on the discriminatory narrative in some instances. 
106. A few examples (listed roughly in order of ascending creativity) include: 
"mulatto"; "half-breed"; "zebra"; "mutt"; "mongrel"; "cholo"; "halfrican"; "oreo"; 
"chigger"; "jewgaboo." I collected these terms from various sources, including cases, 
articles, and discussions with colleagues. See generally NationMaster.com, http:/ I 
www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Ethnic-slurs#M (last visited Feb. 3, 2010). 
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People viewed as multiracial are subject to simultaneous, and 
sometimes conflicting, criticism from various angles. As David Theo 
Goldberg has observed, "there is no single unified phenomenon of 
racism, only a range of racisms." 107 A person may simultaneously 
suffer "rejection for refusing to assimilate" from a majority group and 
be "challenge[d] [by a minority group] as an 'imposter' out for 
personal gain through such programs as affirmative action. "108 
Members of an in-group may shun a person perceived as multiracial 
as less than a full-status member of that group. A person perceived as 
multiracial may be subjected to what Adrian Piper has termed the 
"Suffering Test"-recitation from an in-group member of 
experiences of racism, followed by trivialization of the multiracial 
person's own experiences with racism. 109 Or a multiracial person may 
simply be asked to justify his claim to membership in any group with 
which he might choose to identify. 110 
Kevin Johnson has explored the experience of people perceived to 
be mixed Latino and White, observing that "Latinos of mixed 
heritage at various times feel less than fully accepted by the Latino 
community[,]" but that "being rejected by Latinos does not 
necessarily mean full acceptance by Anglos." 111 He explains that, 
from non-Latinos, "light-skinned Mexican-Americans may suffer 
'microaggressions,' such as racial insults of Mexican-Americans in 
their presence." 112 His example illustrates the distinction between the 
treatment a mixed-identified person and a Latina-identified person 
would receive: An insult of Mexican-Americans in front of a 
mixed-identified, light-skinned Mexican-American constitutes a 
m1croaggression, perhaps a means of testing his racial 
commitments or a means of daring him to "out" himself as Latino. 
But the same comment made in front of a person unequivocally 
identified as Mexican would be an unambiguously aggressive insult 
based on race. In either instance, the comment contributes to a 
racially hostile environment, but the two narratives are 
distinguishable. Moreover, individuals subject to such 
microaggressions also "may be challenged by their fellow Mexican-
107. DAVID THEO GoLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF 
MEANING 213 (1993). 
108. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1288. 
109. Piper, supra note 8, at 7. 
110. See johnson, supra note 2, at 1311 ("My experience has been that others await 
an explanation when I claim to be Mexican-American."). 
Ill. /d.at1293. 
112. !d. at 1292. 
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Americans as being 'too White.'" 113 Johnson explains that "[t]he term 
gabacho, slang for Anglo," is sometimes directed at individuals viewed 
as mixed as a means of exclusion. 114 
Likewise, in some Asian communities-particularly, though not 
exclusively, within those that are relatively insular and are comprised 
of recent immigrants-the prevailing belief is that marriage between 
Asians and members of other races is undesirable. A 1998 study 
found that sixty-nine percent of Chinese-American parents agreed 
with the statement, "I would prefer that my children marry someone 
in the same ethnic group," and fifty percent of younger Chinese 
Americans who were not yet parents also agreed with that 
statement. 115 According to sociologist Betty Lee Sung, interracial 
marriage is "the worst thing that could happen" for many Asian 
parents. 116 Such resistance to interracial marriage is linked to the 
undesirability of multiracial children. As Frank Wu explains, "[e]ach 
set of would-be in-laws may want grandchildren who 'look like us. "'117 
Less academic research has explored Asians' attitudes regarding 
racial mixing, perhaps in part because linguistic obstacles make such 
communities less accessible to a primarily White legal academy. 
But such attitudes are common knowledge within some communities. 
A recent thread on the Asian-themed website ''Yellowworld Forums" 
discussed whether "hapas" (mixed-race Asians) who look "more 
Asian" experience more or less racism than those who are 'just 
Asian."us One commenter who identified herself as half-white and 
half:Japanese explained: 
I'm definitely a more Asian looking hapa. But ironically, I feel 
more racism and discrimination and whatnot from full Asians than 
I do from non-Asians. I don't know if this is because of my height 
and size or my very non-stereotypical Asian culture and look. But I 
definitely feel a little bit [more] uncomfortable or judged in a 
restaurant or store full of Asians than in one with a mixture of non-
Asian and Asian races. 119 
113. !d. 
114. !d. 
115. FLAVIA TAM ET AL., INTER-GENERATIONAL PAPER ON AsiAN AMERICAN ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS FAMILY VALUES, INTERRACIAL DATING AND MARRiAGE 7 (1998). 
116. Barbara Kantrowitz, The Ultimate Assimilation, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 80. 
117. FRANK H. Wu, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 282 
(2002). Wu recalls asking his mother whether she would love him if he married an 
American girl; his mother stated that she would, but responded that "she would love 
[him] more if [he] married a Chinese girl." !d. at 261. 
118. Yellowworld Forums, http:/ /forums.yellowworld.org/archive/index.php?t-
11424.html. 
119. Posting of hapakristina to Yellowworld Forums, http:/ /forums.yellow 
world.org/archive/index.php?t-ll424.html (Dec. 8, 2003, 15:00 EST). She later 
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Another commenter agreed that she "had the impression my hapa 
friends have gotten more crap from other Asians than they have from 
whites."120 And a third explained: "All's well so long as the subject of 
my 'other half doesn't enter into the conversation. If it does, some 
of my friends' Asian friends' perceptions change. They'll still be 
polite and all, but you can almost feel like they think that I'm not one 
of them."121 Thus, while understudied in the academic literature, the 
hostility of some Asian communities to interracial relationships is 
supported by anecdotal evidence and is surely worthy of a more 
detailed examination. 
Animus toward people viewed as racially mixed evokes the 
criticisms of "passing" that have been voiced in decades past. 122 
For example, Randall Kennedy links historical opposition to passing 
with contemporary resistance to Black/White intermarriage and the 
opposition to a multiracial census category. Some members of the 
Black community, he writes, "see these activities as kindred to passing 
and condemn them as 'escapist,' 'inauthentic,' even 'fraudulent' 
efforts that will lead to a debilitating 'whitening' of what should be an 
authentically 'black' African American community." 123 The negative 
reaction of the Black community to Tiger Woods's description of 
himself as "Cablinasian," rather than Black, is simply one example.124 
But multiracial animus as an iteration of antipathy toward passing is 
hardly limited to the traditional Black/White binary. Rather, hostility 
toward individuals perceived as attempting to pass-perhaps by 
asserting a multiracial identity-might be expressed by a member of 
any racial category. Those seen as multiracial may be viewed as 
added: "I've been labeled a sell-out ... a wannabe Asian, ugly, a disgrace. Many, 
many things, and my ex's mother didn't like the fact that a possible mixed non-
Korean, non-full Asian was possibly entering her family." Id. at 20:20 EST. 
The comments drawn from Yellowworld Forums have been edited for capitalization, 
spelling, and punctuation to make them more readable. 
120. Posting of AngryABCGirl to Yellowworld Forums, http:/ /forums.yellow 
world.org/archive/index.php?t-11424.html (Dec. 8, 2003, 15:36 EST). 
121. Posting of Emperor_Mike to Yellowworld Forums, http:/ /forums.yellow 
world.org/archive/index.php?t-11424.html (Dec. 8, 2003, 16:09 EST). 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82. 
123. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 1187-88. I emphasize that I do not claim that 
individuals who oppose a multiracial census category would necessarily disCiiminate 
against individuals who they viewed either as multiracial or as attempting to claim a 
multiracial identity. My point is simply that, just as passing motivated hostility toward 
passers, so might perception of an individual as multiracial motivate hostility toward 
that individual under some circumstances. 
124. See Gary Kamiya, Cablinasian Like Me, SALON, Apr. 30, 1997, 
http:/ /www.salon.com/april97 /tiger970430.html (noting that Woods's self-
identification "infuriated many Mrican Americans who ... see him as a traitor," and 
that "[s]ome blacks saw Woods' [sic] assertion of a multiracial identity as a sellout 
that could touch off an epidemic of 'passing"'). 
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perpetrators of "racial desertion" based on the view, correct or 
otherwise, that they are attempting to opt out of a monoracial group 
to which they owe an intrinsic loyalty. 125 
Hostility toward people seen as employing their mixed-race identity 
to reap social advantage has in some ways intensified with the ascent 
of the multiracial identity movement. In the context of higher 
education, several scholars have raised the concern that mixed-race 
people may be checking the application-form boxes corresponding to 
underrepresented racial groups solely to gain advantage in the 
admissions process. 126 The extent of such academic opportunism is 
unclear, but the possibility undoubtedly engenders resentment. 
Many scholars have attested to firsthand experience with this hostility. 
Kevin Johnson explains that "one fears being accused of claiming to 
be a minority-sometimes by members of the very group with which 
he or she identifies-simply to obtain a 'special' preference."127 
Adrian Piper likewise describes repeated incidents of skepticism 
regarding her race, including an academic colleague who "grilled" 
her regarding her self-identification as Black and what fraction 
"Mrican" ancestry she had. 128 She summarizes: "The implicit 
accusation ... was, of course, that I had fraudulently posed as black 
in order to take advantage of the department's commitment to 
affirmative action."129 
The news also contains a wide array of examples of antipathy 
toward interracial families and multiracial people. Recently released 
tapes reveal former President Nixon making the following statement 
to an aide following the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. 
Wade130 : "There are times when an abortion is necessary. I know that. 
When you have a black and a white ... [o]r a rape." 131 In 1992, the 
volunteer coordinator of Pat Buchanan's Republican presidential 
campaign in New Jersey was removed after he compared mixed 
125. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 1187. 
126. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. 
REv. ll41, 1215-18 (2007) (describing fraud and concealment as two types of racial 
manipulation schemes); Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 
43 UCLA L. REv. 2059, 2074 (1996) (stating that the problem of identity fraud 
"is much less common in the race context [than the religious context], though it 
arises in situations involving either mixed parentage or hard-to-define classifications 
such as Hispanic"). 
127. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1268. 
128. Piper, supra note 8, at 9. 
129. !d. 
130. 410 u.s. 113. 
131. Charlie Savage, On Nixon Tapes, Ambivalence over Abortion, Not Wate~gate, N.Y. 
TIMES, june 24, 2009, at Al. 
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marriages to the cross-breeding of animals. 132 In Alabama in 2000, 
about forty percent of voters opposed a symbolic repeal of Alabama's 
unquestionably unconstitutional anti-miscegenation statute. 133 More 
recently, a principal in Alabama threatened to cancel his school's 
prom if interracial couples attended.134 When a student who was half 
Black and half White asked him who she should go with, he 
reportedly stated: "That's the problem. Your mom and dad 
shouldn't have had you. You were a mistake."135 Although the 
principal was suspended by a vote of four to two for his remarks, 
three years later he was popularly elected and inducted as 
superintendant of the school district. 136 Just within the past year, a 
mixed-race family in Oregon decided to move to a different 
neighborhood to protect their four- and two-year-old daughters after 
suffering repeated instances of racial intimidation, including having 
the words "KKK" and an obscenity spelled out in gasoline on their 
street, 137 and in Buffalo in 2009, an individual whom authorities 
described as a "white supremacist" pled guilty to felony charges 
stemming from burning a cross on the lawn of the home of a mixed-
race couple consisting of a Puerto Rican man and a White woman. 138 
Most recently, in October 2009, Louisiana Justice of the Peace 
Keith Bardwell made national headlines after refusing to marry an 
interracial couple. 139 Bardwell, who has since resigned, reportedly 
refused to marry at least four other interracial couples over the past 
two and a half years. 140 When asked his reasons for refusing to marry 
the couple, he explained that "he was concerned for the children 
that might be born of the relationship and that, in his experience, 
most interracial marriages don't last."141 Bardwell further 
132. Buchanan Aide is Removed over Mixed-Marriage View, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at 
A14. 
133. Elizabeth Becker et al., The 2000 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2000, at B15. 
134. Ronald Smothers, Principal Causes Furor on Mixed-Race Couples, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16,1994, atA16. 
135. Id. 
136. Russ Jamieson, Alabama Town Fears New School Superintendant's Alleged 
Bigotry, CNN INTERACTIVE, July 2, 1997, http:/ /www.cnn.com/US/9707 /02/ 
humphries.return/index.html. 
137. Anita Burke, Hate Crime Suspect Jailed, S. OR. MAIL TRIBUNE, May 31, 2008, 
available at http:/ /www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080531/ 
NEWS/805310308. 
138. Aaron Besecker, Suspect Admits Guilt in Hate Crime, BUFFALO NEWS CI1Y & 
REGION, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http:/ /www.buffalonews.com/cityregion/story/ 
589559.html. 
139. Louisiana justice Who Refused Interracial Marriage Resigns, CNN, Nov. 3, 2009, 
http:/ /www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/03/louisiana.interracial.marriage/index.html. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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emphasized: "I'm not a racist .... I do ceremonies for black couples 
right here in my house. My main concern is for the children."142 
It is worth noting that identification as a multiracial person may 
yield certain arguably positive consequences as well as harms. 
A person labeled multiracial-say, the daughter of a Vietnamese 
father and Irish mother-may be viewed as "exotic" while one labeled 
monoracial-the American-born daughter of two Vietnamese 
immigrants-is still perceived as "foreign." Indeed, certain segments 
of society fetishize the "unusual" physical features of the "ethnically 
ambiguous" with many advertising campaigns that intentionally 
employ models with "racially indeterminate features" that "reflect[] a 
current fascination with the racial hybrid." 143 Yet this exoticization 
can be a double-edged sword. Elizabeth Emens notes our "mixed 
reaction" to those who prefer individuals with certain racial 
characteristics, noting that it is telling that in such circumstances we 
apply the "language of having a 'fetish' as opposed to a 'type.'"144 
Exoticism, Emens concludes, is complicated: "If one is to be treated 
as a thing, one would rather be treated as a rare and pretty thing than 
as a disgusting or dangerous one. But that is still to be treated as a 
th. ,145 mg. 
The dubious advantage associated with this exotiozation 
notwithstanding, people identified as racially mixed are subject to a 
complex and multifaceted web of negative responses from society, 
ranging from discomfort to distaste to outright hostility. These 
negative responses are rooted in a long history of dislike for 
miscegenation and have so far survived-and, in some ways, perhaps 
have even been exacerbated by-the multiracial identity movement. 
The negative responses are not suppressed; rather, they manifest 
themselves in a variety of situations. 
Unsurprisingly, given these various forms of social disapprobation, 
federal case law includes many narratives that reflect hostility toward 
interracial relationships and racial mixing. I want to distinguish 
clearly, however, between cases incidentally describing animus toward 
those perceived as multiracial-of which there are many-and cases 
actually brought by multiracial plaintiffs-of which there are 
142. !d. 
143. Ruth La Feria, Generation E.A.: Ethnically Ambiguous, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 
2003, § 9. 
144. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of 
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1307, 1343 (2009) (exploring intimate discrimination 
in the context of racial, sexual, and (dis) ability based preferences). 
145. !d. at 1344 (quoting PHYLLIS ROSE, jAZZ CLEOPATRA: jOSEPHINE BAKER IN HER 
TIME44 (1989)). 
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extraordinarily few, a phenomenon that serves as the starting point 
for Part III. I discuss the former species of case here-those in which 
the factual background reveals animus against those individuals 
perceived as racially mixed though the case itself does not address a 
claim of multiracial discrimination. For example, an employee seen 
as monoracial may be harassed on the basis of his association with a 
biracial person, often his child. 
A paradigmatic example is Defoe v. Spiva, 146 in which the court 
describes an incident during a high school basketball game where 
students threw Oreos onto the court when a biracial student entered 
the game. 147 The case, however, did not actually involve a claim by 
the biracial student; rather, the plaintiff was a student who claimed 
that his First Amendment rights were violated by the school's 
prohibition on clothing bearing the confederate flag. 148 
In Green v. Franklin National Bank, 149 a black plaintiff filed a Title VII 
claim against her employer, claiming that her termination was 
motivated by racial animus.150 To buttress her claims of bigotry in her 
work environment, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the bank's 
vice president told the plaintiffs direct supervisor, who "is a woman 
of Mrican-American and Caucasian heritage,"151 that she would have 
expected the mixed-race manager's "son to have blue eyes like his 
father." 152 When the supervisor stated that her son had brown eyes, 
the vice president asked, "[D]oes that mean she [sic] is full of shit 
like you?"153 The vice president made other comments about the 
mixed-race supervisor's children, including, "[S]o you have poo poo 
kids too."154 
Wheaton v. North Oakland Medical Centef5" likewise paints a troubling 
picture of animus against multiracial individuals. In that case, 
a White plaintiff who worked in a predominantly Black division 
brought a claim of employment discrimination. 156 The plaintiff 
testified that her coworker described her daughter, whose father is 
Black, as a "half-breed."157 Other coworkers also made disparaging 
146. No. 3:06-CV-450, 2008 WL 80258 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2008). 
147. /d. at *2. 
148. /d. at *1. 
149. 459 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006). 
150. /d. at 906. 
151. /d. at 907. 
152. /d. at 910. 
153. /d. 
154. /d. 
155. 130 F. App'x 773 (6th Cir. 2005). 
156. /d. at 776-77. 
157. /d. 
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comments about the plaintiff's interracial relationship and left an 
email in her desk drawer containing a magazine article condemning 
relationships between White women and Black men. 158 
In Madison v. IBP, Inc./ 59 the plaintiffs coworkers also expressed 
animus against her children specifically because the children were 
seen as mixed-race. 160 The plaintiff, "a Caucasian woman married to 
an African American man," presented "detailed evidence" of "an 
unusual record of pervasive harassment" based both on her sex and 
on her "interracial family." 161 Her coworkers made derogatory and 
racist comments about her husband and children, stating that she 
had '"ruined herself by marrying a black man and having biracial 
children." 162 
While Defoe, Green, Wheaton, and Madison offer a few examples of 
hostility directed at those perceived as multiracial, they are far from 
idiosyncratic. Many other federal cases describe animus against 
interracial relationships and the children born of such unions. 163 
158. /d. at 777-78. 
159. 330 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2003). 
160. /d. at 1053. The district court included additional details, such as the fact 
that a coworker referred to the plaintiff's children as "monkeys" and "zebras," asked 
her "what are you doing with a fucking nigger having fucking nigger babies," and 
asserted that "niggers and whites should stay with their own." Madison v. IBP, Inc., 
149 F. Supp. 2d 730, 752 (S.D. Iowa 1999). 
161. Madison, 330 F.3d at 1053. 
162. /d. 
163. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coli., 521 F.3d 130, 131-32, 134 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(denying summary judgment to the defendants where a White basketball coach 
married to a Black woman was fired after his supervisor called him "nigger lover" and 
asked whether he was "going to marry that Aunt Jemima"); Austin v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
67 F. App'x 956, 957-58 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing a complaint by a female forklift 
driver-who kept a picture of her biracial child on her forklift-that she was fired 
after complaining about a coworker's derogatory racial comments about her child); 
Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 
988, 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that an individual brought a cognizable Title 
VII claim when he alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action because he 
had a biracial daughter); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 
581, 589 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that a White woman stated an employment 
discrimination claim on the ground that she was fired for dating a Black man), 
vacated in part on other grounds by 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Parr v. Woodmen of 
the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 890, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 
White salesman stated a cognizable claim by alleging failure to hire based on his 
marriage to a Black woman); Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 WL 
4093352, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2008) (noting that coworkers expressed 
disapproval of the relationship between a White prison worker and a Black former 
inmate); Frazier v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:07-0818, 2008 WL 2781665, at *1-2 
(M.D. Tenn. July 14, 2008) (noting that a White female prison employee was 
harassed by Black coworkers after her marriage to a Black man and that, when she 
reported the harassment, her supervisor told her that "there were things she had to 
expect" regarding her marriage); Kanitz v. Cooke, No. 03-10180, 2008 WL 2199672, 
at *1-2, 7 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2008) (holding that, where a Black prisoner brought 
suit alleging that he and his White girlfriend (as well as other interracial couples) 
were treated with greater suspicion during visiting hours, "plaintiffs have alleged 
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State court cases likewise evidence animus against multiracial 
people. In Loeffelman v. Board of Education, 164 an eighth-grade English 
teacher brought a First Amendment claim challenging her 
termination for making derogatory comments about biracial 
children. 165 She stated that "mixed children" are "racially confused" 
and "dirty"; that they "come to school with 'dirty little faces and their 
hair never combed properly"'; and that "a female in an interracial 
relationship should have herself 'fixed' so she can never have 
children."166 Her comments were delivered in front of biracial 
students during regular school hours, and the students later testified 
to the psychological harm they suffered as a result of her 
comments. 167 The court ultimately rejected the teacher's claim that 
her remarks were made in her private capacity and therefore were 
protected by the First Amendment.168 While Loeffelman is an 
unusually explicit example, state court case law also contains many 
examples of hostility to racial mixing in cases involving employment 
discrimination, 169 housing discrimination, 170 and child custody. 171 
violation of a clearly established constitutional right-the right to be free from 
disparate treatment based on their status as a mixed-race couple"); Campbell v. 
Bradshaw, No. 2:05-cv-193, 2007 WL 4991266, at *27 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 2007) 
(describing a biracial convicted prisoner's experience of racial harassment, including 
frequently being called "half breed" and "zebra," and finding that confusion about 
his racial identity led to "self-esteem problems, alienation, anger, poor self-
confidence, and isolation"); Krieman v. Crystal Lake Apartments Ltd., No. 05 C 0348, 
2006 WL 1519320, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2006) (describing the defendant's 
derogatory comments about the plaintiff's son, which included calling him both 
"nigger" and "biracial boy," and stating pejoratively that "she [the plaintifl] has this 
biracial boy running around"); EEOC v. Foodcrafters Distrib. Co., No. Civ. 03-
2796(RBK), 2006 WL 489718, at *5 (D.NJ. Feb. 24, 2006) (describing harassment 
experienced by a White plaintiff after coworkers learned she had a biracial child); 
Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., No. 00-6134-CV-SJ-GAF, 2006 WL 223111, at *6 (W.D. 
Mo. Jan. 30, 2006) (describing a religious organization known as the "Christian 
Separatist Church" which "mandate[s] ... absolute racial separation" and forbids 
"African-Americans, Jews, and 'mongrels'" from membership as enforcement of the 
organization's belief that "the Sixth Commandment is translated as 'You will not 
mongrelize"'); Monley v. Q Int'l Courier, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1156 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) (describing a female employee's allegation that she was terminated because 
she was involved in an interracial relationship and had a biracial child); Rosenblatt v. 
Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 946 F. Supp. 298, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the 
plaintiffs allegation that he was discriminated against as a result of his marriage to a 
Black woman). 
164. 134 S.W.3d 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
165. /d. at 639. 
166. /d. at 641. 
167. /d. at 644. 
168. /d. at 645-46. 
169. See Gonzalez v. Rinard, No. E041658, 2008 WL 257443, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 31, 2008) (noting that a boss involved in a romantic relationship with an 
employee called her a "Nigger lover" because she was the single mother of a mixed-
race child); Ky. Lottery Corp. v. Riles, No. 2004-CA-001053-MR, 2007 WL 1785451, at 
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. June 8, 2007) (noting, in the course of upholding a jury verdict for 
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My point in detailing instances of animus toward racial mixing 
from federal and state case law is not to provide an exhaustive catalog 
of such incidents. Rather, I simply wish to establish that judges are 
not blind to such animus-in fact, they regularly encounter it and 
describe it in their opm10ns. These examples, therefore, 
demonstrate that judges are aware of mixed-race discrimination. 
Indeed, judicial oblivion is particularly unlikely given the many news 
stories that describe hatred directed at multiracial individuals. 172 
In sum, overwhelming evidence indicates that animus against 
people identified as multiracial persists. Such animus is distinct from 
animus directed at members of monoracial groups, and multiracial 
animus is even discussed in many judicial opinions. Yet this animus 
does not manifest itself in antidiscrimination claims brought by 
people identified as mixed-race. The next Part discusses the dearth 
of claims in which a plaintiff alleges multiracial discrimination and 
traces the reasons underlying the absence of such claims. 
the plaintiff on a claim of racial employment discrimination, that a Black plaintiff's 
supervisors made disparaging remarks about his Black/Filipino mixed-race children 
and stated that his speech was "too black"); Boggs v. Phillip S. Van Embden, P.C., 
No. L-00257-03, 2005 WL 3158037, at *2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 29, 2005) 
(describing a White plaintiff's allegations that her boss expressed hostility to mixed-
race intimacy-by questioning why no one had told him her children were biracial 
after seeing a photograph of them, by asking her whether a group of Black high 
school boys knew her children's father or whether she had dated them, and by 
stating that "he didn't understand why white girls would go with black men"-and 
holding the allegations insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Hunt v. Trumbull 
Cmty. Action Program, No. 2005-T-0036, 2006 WL 847225, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
31, 2006) (noting that an employee's "Mrican-American supervisor told her that she 
did not believe that it was right that she had biracial children"). 
170. See Matteo v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 761 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 
2003) (noting that the landlord refused to rent to mixed-race couples); Hobbs Realty 
& Constr. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 593 S.E.2d 103, 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (noting 
that the landlords refused to give a key to their tenants' biracial adult daughter and 
her three friends (two White, one Black) and that they used a racial epithet); Allison 
v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 716 A.2d 689, 690 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (noting 
that the landlord told prospective tenants that she "had to be leery of mixed coufles" 
because her current tenants might move out); W. Va. Human Rights Comm n v. 
Wilson Estates, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 6, 11 (W.Va. 1998) (noting that the White woman 
tenant was evicted for having mixed-race guests). 
171. See Dansby v. Dansby, 189 S.W.3d 473 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting 
evidence that a father was teaching discrimination by objecting to his ex-wife dating 
White men and thus exposing the children to a "biracial situation"). However, the 
dissenting opinion contended that the majority was ignoring the racism that the 
father was instilling in the children-for example, the older daughter was 
"embarrassed" to see her mother in a restaurant with a White man, suggesting that 
she had already internalized her father's racist norms, while the younger daughter 
was simply "confused." /d. at 483 (Pittman,]., dissenting). 
172. See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text (collecting examples of 
mixed-race animus in the news). 
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III. "DISCRETE AND INSUIAR" 173: THE PROBLEM WITH CATEGORIES 
Only a handful of race discrimination cases have been brought by 
plaintiffs explicitly identified as multiracial. Given the overwhelming 
evidence of animus against multiracial individuals discussed in Part 
II, it would be naive to theorize that multiracial people simply do not 
suffer from racist treatment. Rather, I argue that plaintiffs seldom 
allege multiracial discrimination because antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence is premised upon the existence of clearly drawn racial 
categories. Indeed, proof of discrimination generally requires 
individuals to show that they were treated worse due to their 
membership in some category as compared to people outside that 
category. This dependence on categories renders antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence inhospitable to people identified and discriminated 
against as multiracial. Because their ascribed racial identity does not 
fit neatly into conventional categories, they cannot deploy those 
categories as a means to demonstrate the racist treatment they 
suffered. 
This Part first briefly summarizes the categorical foundations of 
our antidiscrimination jurisprudence. It then describes the few cases 
where individuals specifically identified as multiracial have brought 
antidiscrimination claims, and demonstrates the tension between 
those claims and the categorical model. To resolve that tension, 
courts have generally reformulated claims of discrimination brought 
by multiracial people to comport with the categorical model, and 
have acknowledged multiracial discrimination only when the facts 
leave no other alternative. 
A. Categorical Foundations 
Our antidiscrimination jurisprudence is built around the existence 
of clear categories. In 1938, Justice Stone, writing for the majority in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co./ 74 left open the question of 
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry."175 The famous Carolene Products footnote generated 
an entire jurisprudence in which protection of an individual against 
discrimination depended on whether that individual fell into a 
173. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
174. 304 u.s. 144. 
175. !d. at 152 n.4. 
506 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:469 
"discrete" category-one for which the very terminology implies that 
the category is straightforward and has distinct boundaries. 
The Supreme Court soon directed the "more searching judicial 
inquiry" of Carotene Products at racial categories. The Court's first 
explicit reference to race as a "suspect" class for discrimination 
occurred in Korematsu v. United States. 176 Ironically, Korematsu reached 
the rare conclusion that a classification that imposed a disadvantage 
based on race could survive strict scrutiny. 177 But more importantly 
for present purposes, Justice Black's opinion accepted the categorical 
nature of race without question: "[A] lllegal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is 
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional . . . . Pressing 
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such 
restrictions .... "178 Indeed, Justice Murphy's dissent, while protesting 
the majority decision to uphold the internment of individuals with 
Japanese ancestry, parallels the majority in conflating race and 
national origin while asserting the categorical nature of both. 179 
He believed that the exclusion order applicable to "all persons of 
Japanese ancestry" was "an obvious racial discrimination," and he 
dissented from "this legalization of racism" without questioning 
whether the group subject to internment comprised a discrete 
category. 180 
As it decided milestone civil rights cases, the Warren Court 
perpetuated the view of race as categorical and stable. Even in Loving 
v. Virginia, the Court described the anti-miscegenation statute it 
ultimately invalidated as "proscrib[ing] generally accepted conduct if 
engaged in by members of different races."181 The Court 
automatically accepted that racial categories are fixed classifications 
in which one is either a member or a non-member-an ironic stance 
given that Loving would presumably call those categories into 
question by legalizing marriage between members of supposedly 
different· racial categories and paving the way for offspring whose 
identities in relation to the categories would be unclear. 182 
The entrenched notion of race as discrete and categorical survived 
176. 323 u.s. 214 (1944). 
177. See KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 631 (14th 
ed. 2001). 
178. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added). 
179. See id. at 233, 235-38 (Murphy,]., dissenting). 
180. !d. at 234, 242. 
181. 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967). 
182. !d. at 5. 
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the Warren Court. In the 1984 case Palmore v. Sidoti, 183 the Court 
invalidated a custody decision based solely on the race of the parties 
involved, explaining that "[c]lassi£Ying persons according to their 
race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public 
h h d . h ,184 concerns; t e race, not t e person, 1ctates t e category. 
This implicit acceptance of stable racial classifications and 
corresponding tiers of scrutiny continues today. For example, the 
Court recently invalidated a school redistricting scheme in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. l 85 without 
commenting on the descriptive utility of the racial classifications at 
issue. 
The Court has likewise assumed the categorical nature of racial 
identity when deciding cases brought pursuant to Title VII. 
The burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green186 and refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine18i requires the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case by 
showing: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for 
the position which she held or to which she applied; (3) rejection for 
the position despite her qualifications; and ( 4) selection of an 
individual outside the protected class to replace the plaintiff. 188 
The Court has assumed that membership in a protected class is stable 
and defined by conventional racial categories. Indeed, McDonnell 
Douglas itself equated the first part of the prima facie case with a 
requirement that the plaintiff allege membership in a "racial 
minority," implying that minority membership is both obvious and 
lf . ..l fi . 189 se -ue tntng. 
In each instance, the Court's decision presumed the categorical 
nature of group identity. Categories are the framework from which 
the rest of our antidiscrimination jurisprudence flows. Courts review 
claims of discrimination in light of the existence of a category to 
which the individual claiming the discrimination belongs. Whether a 
plaintiff succeeds on a claim of race discrimination hinges on a 
showing that she was discriminated against because she was Asian 
(or Black, or White, etc.). In other words, proving discrimination 
implicitly entails a link to the underlying category against which 
ammus IS directed. Categories are so central to our 
183. 466 U.S. 429. 
184. I d. at 432. 
185. 551 u.s. 701 (2007). 
186. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
187. 450 u.s. 248 (1981). 
188. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
189. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
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antidiscrimination jurisprudence that we have difficulty conceiving 
what a race discrimination claim would look like without a 
description of animus directed at one of the socially acknowledged 
racial categories. The claim, "I was fired because of my race," thus 
invites the question, "So what race are you?" 
As a result of this dependence on categories, antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence is a lonely place for individuals-such as those who are 
identified as multiracial-whose identification transcends prevailing 
categorical schemes. When multiracial individuals have brought 
claims alleging that they were discriminated against because they were 
perceived as multiracial, courts have generally skirted the issue of 
their race. The next Section details that evasion and explores its 
consequences within courts' decision-making processes. 
B. judicial Treatment of Multiracial Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs explicitly identified as multiracial or biracial are a rarity 
within antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Searching Westlaw for 
federal cases brought within the past two decades yielded only three 
Equal Protection claims and five Title VII claims brought by explicitly 
identified mixed-race plaintiffs. 190 All were district court cases, and 
five of the eight were unpublished. Multiracial plaintiffs, then, are 
seldom identified even at the district court level and are wholly 
absent from appellate and Supreme Court decisions within 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Remarkably, I was unable to locate 
any state court decisions within the past twenty years brought by a 
person identified as mixed-race. 191 This paucity of claims brought by 
plaintiffs identified as multiracial does not mean that no such 
190. To identifY federal cases, I conducted the following search in Westlaw's 
"ALLFEDS" database: (biracial multiracial "mixed race" "racially mixed") & ("equal 
protection" "title vii") & da(aft 01/01/1990). This search yielded 329 cases, which I 
then read to determine whether the plaintiff in the case was explicitly identified as 
multiracial. The vast majority of plaintiffs were not. Three cases in which the 
plaintiff was explicitly identified as multiracial involved Equal Protection claims. 
Moore v. Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 2d 641 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Cannon v. Burkybile, 
No. 99 C 4623, 2000 WL 1409852 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2000); Godby v. Montgomery 
County Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Five cases involved Title 
VII claims. Smith v. CA, Inc, No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776 (M.D. Fla. 
Dec. 30, 2008); Watkins v. Hospitality Group Management, Inc., No. 1:02CV00897, 
2003 WL 22937710 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2003); Callicutt v. Pepsi Bottling Group, No. 
CIV. 00-95DWFAJB, 2002 WL 992757 (D. Minn. May 13, 2002); Mitchell v. Champs 
Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1998); Walker v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of 
Regents, Civ. A. No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994). 
191. To identifY state cases, I conducted the same search described supra note 190 
in Westlaw's "ALLSTATES" database. This search yielded 85 cases, but none of them 
involved mixed-race plaintiffs. 
2010] JUDICIAL ERASURE OF MIXED-RACE DISCRIMINATION 509 
plaintiffs have brought claims-it simply means that courts have only 
acknowledged the plaintiffs multiracial identification in eight cases. 192 
Recognizing that any generalizations drawn from so small a 
number of cases are necessarily tentative, I suggest the following 
descriptive pattern: courts have generally lumped individuals 
identified as multiracial together with other members of 
conventional categories, reformulating the narrative of 
discrimination of those identified as multiracial to avoid disruption of 
the prevailing racial classification scheme. Only in a few instances 
have courts acknowledged discrimination against multiracial 
individuals qua multiracial individuals and then only when the 
circumstances evinced animus so explicitly motivated by racial 
mixedness that there was no alternative. I first discuss the former 
type of case, then the latter. Finally, I briefly explain why courts' 
limited acknowledgment of discrimination against interracial couples 
is not tantamount to acknowledgment of discrimination against 
multiracial people. 
1. Categorical reformulation of multiracial identification 
In most instances, courts have addressed multiracial plaintiffs' 
claims by reformulating them to comport with the prevailing scheme 
of racial classification. This Subsection details courts' vanous 
strategies for channeling multiracial plaintiffs into the existing 
categorical system. 
One court has explicitly denied multiracial identification as a 
ground for a separate discrimination claim. In Walker v. University of 
Colorado Board of Regents, 193 the plaintiff filed a Title VII claim 
following his unsuccessful application for Associate Vice President for 
Human Resources. 194 He "identified himself as a multiracial person 
of Black, Native American, Jewish and Anglo descent," and 
contended that under the McDonnell Douglas framework, "the 
protected class is limited to multiracial persons."195 The court 
rejected his argument "because it would be impracticable to apply 
and could be so self limiting that a particular person is the only 
identifiable member of the group."1!l6 Moreover, the court held that 
the plaintiffs multiracial status actually diminished his likelihood of 
192. I believe that the reasons for this lack of acknowledgment are multiple and 
complex. See supra Part IV.A (discussing possible explanations for the exclusion of 
multiracial individuals from antidiscrimination jurisprudence). 
193. Civ. A. No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994). 
194. /d. at *1. 
195. /d. 
196. /d. 
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success: "Multiracial persons may be considered members of each of 
the protected groups with which they have any significant 
identification."l\17 The logical extension of this statement is that if the 
position to which the plaintiff in Walker applied were filled by a Black, 
Native American, Jewish, or Anglo individual, courts should view that 
individual as a member of the plaintiff's protected class for Title VII 
purposes. Defining the scope of the plaintiffs protected class in this 
manner would preclude the plaintiff from demonstrating that he was 
disadvantaged because of his race in favor of a person similarly 
situated. Walker therefore highlights a concrete problem associated 
with failure to acknowledge uniquely multiracial discrimination: 
it forecloses the plaintiff from demonstrating that he is not similarly 
situated to individuals who are not multiracial. 
While Walker thus functions as an explicit denial of uniquely 
multiracial discrimination, courts more typically engage in a subtle 
reframing of the discriminatory narrative. One paradigmatic case to 
which I have already alluded198 is Mitchell v. Champs Sports, in which 
the plaintiff testified that her mother was White and her father was 
Black, but based on her appearance, "many people consider her of 
mixed Hispanic and European descent." 199 Her treatment by her 
employer rapidly deteriorated after her supervisor noticed that she 
was often visited at the store by her Black friends and relatives; at one 
point, after a visit from a Black male friend, the supervisor 
commented that "she only dated black men."200 In allowing the 
plaintiffs claim to proceed,201 the court simply stated that the 
treatment deteriorated after her supervisor "discovered ... that she 
was black."202 This narrative reveals a troubling application of a 
principle rather like hypodescent: although the plaintiff testified that 
her mother was White and her father was Black, the court reframed 
her self-description and classified her simply as Black. In so doing, it 
failed to acknowledge the possibility that her poor treatment was 
motivated by animus against racial mixing. The employer may have 
perceived the plaintiff as mixed, and therefore racially deceptive, 
rather than simply as Black. 
197. !d. 
198. See supra notes 27-29. 
199. 42 F. Supp. 2d 642,646 (E.D. Tex. 1998). 
200. !d. 
201. !d. at 650. The case arose on the plaintiff's motion for appointed counsel, 
which the court granted, stating: "Because Mitchell's allegations, if proven, would 
likely establish intentional discrimination and support a verdict in Mitchell's favor, 
her claim has probative merit." !d. 
202. !d. (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, Callicutt v. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. 20:l involved Title VII 
claims brought by five plaintiffs, of whom the court stated flatly: 
"Plaintiffs are Mrican-American."204 For four of the plaintiffs, the 
claimed incidents involved racial epithets and negative comments 
about Black people. 205 But for one plaintiff, the alleged incidents 
wove a more complex racial narrative.206 Some coworkers referred to 
him as "FUBU," invoking a Black identity.207 Others referred to him 
as "Sinbad," a reference that is less clear.208 And one coworker told 
him that "he was not black"-only in discussing that incident did the 
court mention that the plaintiff was "biracial and admits that he has a 
light complexion."209 But the court did not explore the complex 
situation in which the plaintiff found himself-discriminated against 
as Black by some, and as "not-really-Black" by others-and instead 
opted to categorize the mixed-race plaintiff as "Mrican-American" 
like the other four plaintiffs.210 The court allowed the claims of all 
plaintiffs to survive summary judgment except those of the mixed-race 
plaintiff, holding that the instances of discrimination he suffered 
were not sufficiently severe to support a Title VII claim. 211 While one 
can never predict with certainty the result a court will reach, I believe 
that, had the court considered the multiracial dimension to the 
rejected plaintiff's discriminatory narrative, it might have viewed the 
comments as more serious. For example, the court's analysis omits 
any discussion of the comment that the light-skinned plaintiff was 
"not really black." In the aggregate, a more thorough analysis of the 
multiracial dynamic may have persuaded the court that the plaintiffs 
case should survive summary judgment. 
In other instances, while the court nominally acknowledges that 
the plaintiff was identified as multiracial, it fails to develop the 
implications of that identification in its discussion. One such case is 
Godby v. Montgomery County Board of Education,212 in which the court 
considered an Equal Protection challenge to a school's practice of 
203. No. CIV. 00-95DWFAJB, 2002 WL 992757 (D. Minn. May 13, 2002). 
204. /d. at *1. 
205. /d. at *1-5. 
206. See id. at *4 (discussing the distinct racial treatment one plaintiff received 
because he was biracial). 
207. /d. The court explained that "FUBU" is "an African-American line of 
clothing, which stands for "For Us By Us." /d. 
208. /d. Sinbad is a relatively light-skinned Black stand-up comedian and actor. 
See Sinbad, The Internet Movie Database, http:/ /www.imdb.com/name/nm0005435 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2010). 
209. Callicutt, 2002 WL 992757, at *4. 
210. /d. at *10-11. 
211. /d. at *11. 
212. 996 F. Supp. 1390 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
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mandating that there would be one White and one Black 
representative from each grade on the homecoming court each 
year.213 Each homeroom held a vote to nominate students for the 
homecoming court; the ballot for the nomination was divided into 
"White" and "Black" categories.214 The plaintiff, a student at the 
school, had one White parent and one Black parent.215 She "thinks of 
herself as being 'both' races; and when she has been asked for her 
race on forms, such as those at school, she has routinely checked 
both categories."216 
On the day of the homecoming court nominations, a student 
suggested that the plaintiff should run as the homeroom's Black 
nominee.217 "Matters became complicated when one of [the 
plaintiffs] classmates said that she should run as the homeroom's 
white nominee. Other students complained that it would be unfair 
for [the plaintiff] to run for both slots, and a discussion about race 
ensued among the students."218 At one point, the homeroom teacher 
took the plaintiff outside and told her that she could only run in one 
category and that she would have to decide whether to run in the 
Black category or the White category.219 The school's homecoming 
director was eventually summoned to the classroom, and she told the 
plaintiff that she had to choose one slot or the other in which to run: 
In effect, the biracial child had to choose: was she white or black? 
[The plaintiff] returned to the room and asked her classmates 
which slot she should choose. The majority of the classmates told 
her that she should run as the white nominee. [The plaintiff] ran 
for the white slot and was selected as her homeroom's [white] 
• 220 
nominee. 
But when the school-wide ballot was disseminated, the plaintiff's 
name was not on it.221 Although the school claimed that she had 
been omitted due to an unrelated procedural irregularity, the 
school's homecoming director "admitted that she used the school 
computer in the guidance counselor's office to look up [the 
plaintiff's] race" and found that "the registry on the school computer 
listed [the plaintiff] as Black."222 The h~mecoming director justified 
213. !d. at 1396. 
214. !d. 
215. !d. 
216. !d. 
217. !d. at 1396-97. 
218. !d. at 1397. 
219. !d. 
220. !d. 
221. !d. 
222. !d. 
2010] JUDICIAL ERASURE OF MIXED-RACE DISCRIMINATION 513 
her actions by explaining that "she thought that it was her 'duty to 
make sure what [the plaintiff] was telling [her] was true."'223 When 
the plaintiff discovered that her name was not on the ballot, she 
asked the homecoming director why, and the homecoming director 
stated that it was because she "had looked up her school records and 
discovered that [the plaintiff] was black."224 
In the factual section of its opinion, the court acknowledged that 
"the biracial child had to choose,"225 thereby implicitly suggesting 
harm unique to mixed-race identification. But despite this 
acknowledgment, the court did not further explore the unique injury 
suffered by the plaintiff. Rather, it struck down the school's 
classification system on more general grounds, holding simply that 
the Fourteenth Amendment "bars the racial distinctions [that the 
school adopted] in its homecoming nominations."226 It also noted 
that "[i]t does not matter ... that the categorization in this case 
applied to everyone."227 The court's only acknowledgment of the 
particular harm to the biracial plaintiff was one oblique comment: 
"The classification paints only with the broad brush of black and 
white, ignoring any subtleties," and is thus unlikely to be narrowly 
tailored. 228 The court's decision denying summary judgment to the 
defendants is otherwise a general indictment of the use of racial 
categories without narrow tailoring and a compelling government 
• 229 
mterest. 
The court's analysis could have been phrased the same way had the 
case been brought by a White, Black, or Asian student, and its 
generalized invalidation is a legally correct way of deciding the case. 
Yet the analysis also reflects a choice to ignore the nuances of the 
factual narrative, which indicated an injury unique to a person 
identified as multiracial. A person perceived as monoracial would 
not have been subject to her classmates' debate over her racial 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 1398. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 1407. 
227. Id. at 1408. 
228. Id. at 1410. At the very end of its Equal Protection analysis, the court also 
noted that the school "has engaged in a practice of racially classifying students for 
purposes of extracurricular activities, and perhaps enforcing a rigid racial system 
which considers all (partial) non-whites to be 'black."' I d. at 1411. This comment 
might be read as a gesture at the possibility that the school disqualified the plaintiff 
from running as the White nominee because she was mixed-race, but the phrasing is 
open to interpretation. 
229. See id. at 1407-11 (rejecting the school system's position on the ground that 
the system presented no remedy to any problem, let alone a narrowly tailored 
remedy). 
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identity. Nor would a teacher have taken a student perceived as 
monoracial into the hall and instructed her that she had to choose 
one of the established racial categories. Nor would the chosen racial 
identification of a student perceived as monoracial have engendered 
suspicion in an administrator such that the administrator felt 
compelled to verify the "truth" of that self-identification. Nor would 
a student perceived as monoracial have been deprived, ultimately, of 
the opportunity to compete in the homecoming nomination process. 
In effect, the school erased the plaintiffs biracial identity with its 
categorical homecoming nomination system; the court in turn erased 
that same identity with a generalized invalidation that failed to 
acknowledge the harm imposed by the school. In so doing, the court 
revealed its reluctance to engage the complexities of multiracial 
identification and to acknowledge the unique injuries suffered by 
multiracial people by categories that do not include them. 
Smith v. CA., /nc. 230 provides another example of judicial denial of 
multiracial animus. The plaintiff, a "biracial African American and 
Caucasian[,]" brought a Tide VII claim contending that he had 
suffered an adverse employment action on account of his race. 231 
The facts alleged convey a unique multiracial dynamic. The court 
noted that the plaintiff, Walter Smith, asked his employer to classify 
him as Caucasian and that his employer agreed to do so.232 In his 
deposition, Smith explained that he is biracial, stating, "I pick and 
choose what I call myself, or how I identify myself, dependent on the 
situation at hand and what's beneficial for me at the time."'233 Smith 
added that he received racially derogatory treatment from both 
White and Black people, noting, '" [S]ince I get hit from both sides, 
I play both sides."'234 Smith's remark indicated that at least some 
people tended to identify him as racially mixed, and his request that 
his employer classify him as Caucasian indicated that he himself 
identified at least in some ways as White. And by making the request, 
he made his mixed-race background salient to the employer, 
increasing the likelihood that his coworkers perceived him as 
multiracial. 
Moreover, the instances of discrimination that Smith alleged are 
frankly ambiguous with respect to how he was perceived. In one 
230. No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2008). 
231. /d. at *5, *11. 
232. /d. at *2 n.3. 
233. /d. 
234. /d. 
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instance, a coworker referred to him as a "bitch" and as a "boy."235 
When addressed to an adult male, these terms are perhaps most 
associated with anti-Black animus. Yet another coworker made a 
derogatory comment about Mrican-American fathers in Smith's 
presence.236 This comment is more open to interpretation: it might 
have been motivated by animus against Black people, or it might have 
been targeted at Smith because he had a Black father and a White 
mother. But while the court nominally acknowledged that the 
plaintiff was biracial, it tailored its analysis of his employment 
discrimination claim to match a standard anti-Black narrative of 
discrimination; the court did not acknowledge the multiracial 
dynamic of Smith's racial self-identification coupled with the nature 
of the discrimination he alleged.237 
The court stated tersely: 
There is no dispute that Smith was a member of a protected group 
as a biracial Mrican American and Caucasian. Smith has provided 
evidence of only two instances in which he was arguably harassed 
based on his protected characteristic. The first instance involved 
the "bitch/boy" comments made by [a coworker]. The second 
instance involved the comments made by [a different coworker] 
about Mrican American fathers. 238 
The court ultimately decided the case against Smith on the ground 
that he did not suffer an adverse employment action,239 and therefore 
a firm resolution of whether the harassment he suffered was based on 
his protected characteristic was not essential to the outcome of the 
case. But the court failed even to acknowledge that, were it to 
grapple with the sufficiency of Smith's allegations of discrimination, 
the question was a complicated one. By failing to engage the 
possibility that the comments were motivated by the employer's 
identification of Smith as biracial rather than Black, the court 
essentially ignored the record evidence that potentially supported a 
reading of animus against Smith as biracial. 
A comparison of Moore v. Dolgencorp, Inc. 240 and Watkins v. Hospitality 
Group Management, /nc.241 provides telling evidence of the courts' 
235. /d. at *l n.l. 
236. See id. at *1 (describing Smith's claim that a coworker "stated he was 
surprised an Mrican American father like Smith would fight so hard for custody of 
his children"). 
237. See id. at *11 (considering the frequency and severity of the racial remarks 
and the defendant's remedial action in response to comments from the plaintiff's 
coworker). 
238. /d. 
239. /d. 
240. No. 1:05-CV-107, 2006 WL 2701058 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006). 
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insistence on categorization in the antidiscrimination context. 
In Moore, an African-American woman who brought a Title VII claim 
after being replaced at her job described herself as dark-skinned, 
"even within the range of other African Americans, and especially 
compared to persons of non-African-American heritage, including 
persons of mixed race."242 She argued that she was treated worse than 
a mixed-race person who had considerably lighter skin. 243 The court 
rejected the claim, holding that the mixed-race individual "is a 
member of plaintiffs protected class."244 It further held: 
To recognize a legal hierarchy within the protected class of race 
based upon differences in the hues of skin color would create or 
deny legal remedies based upon sub-categories of this class that 
Congress has not chosen to recognize. It could also open the door 
to nearly insurmountable issues of proof in court regarding the 
actual racial heritage of a plaintiff and/or a person replacing a 
plaintiff, not to mention difficulties for everyone in the daily 
application of the Civil Rights Act.245 
In short, the court held that a biracial person with Black ancestry 
and a non-mixed-race Black person are equivalent for Title VII 
purposes. This decision essentially affirms the logic of hypodescent-
if someone is even partially Black, then that person is Black and is 
properly classified with other Black people. 
Moore's analysis contrasts sharply with the court's brief statement in 
Watkins. There, the court explained that the plaintiff "is a female of 
mixed race who was fired and replaced by a white male," and that 
"to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she need only 
demonstrate that her job performance met [her employer's] 
legitimate expectations when she was fired." 246 The court thus found 
it obvious that a mixed-race person was a member of a different racial 
class than a white person-so obvious, in fact, that no further analysis 
was needed. That the issue of whether a mixed-race person is held to 
be comparable to a monoracial person is resolved one way when the 
monoracial person is White and another way when the monoracial 
241. No. l:02CV00897, 2003 WL 22937710 (M.D.N.C. Dec. l, 2003). 
242. Moore, 2006 WL 2701058, at *2. 
243. /d. Moore seems like a strong candidate for a color claim, and, indeed, she 
attempted to raise such a claim before the district court. See id. at *3 (stating that this 
"appears to be a back-door attempt to . . . add claims of sex and color 
discrimination"). But the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over that 
claim because the plaintiff had failed to raise it before the EEOC and thus had failed 
to exhaust her administrative remedies as required under Title VII. /d. at *3-4. 
244. /d. at *4. 
245. /d. 
246. Watkins, 2003 WL 22937710, at *9. 
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person is Black demonstrates the arbitrariness of the courts' rulings 
on these issues. It also demonstrates the extent to which hypodescent 
continues to infect judicial reasoning, even if courts now make such 
judgments implicitly rather than explicitly. Most importantly for 
purposes of this Article, the two cases both reveal a judicial 
unwillingness to grapple with the complexity of multiracial identity in 
the context of antidiscrimination jurisprudence. 
2. Limited acknowledgment of mixed-race discrimination 
In the cases in which courts have addressed plaintiffs' multiracial 
identification, they did so because the narrative of multiracial 
discrimination was so explicit that they had no alternative but to 
deviate from the established monoracial narrative. Only two such 
examples appear in the case law. 
One, Moore v. Board of Education,247 involved a claimed Equal 
Protection violation brought by a student described as an "Mrican-
American/Caucasian mixed race male" who suffered harassment 
from a Black teacher as a result of his mixed ancestry.248 Among 
other allegations, the teacher referred to the plaintiff as a 
"Euronigger"; told other students that the plaintiff "was like a 
plantation owner telling students what to do"; told one of the 
plaintiffs friends not to lower a blind after plaintiff had asked him to 
because "it's the Caucasian blood in him that he thinks he can tell 
you what to do"; stated that he didn't know whether the plaintiff 
"was Caucasian or Negroid"; stated that the plaintiff was arrogant 
because of his lighter complexion; and stated that the plaintiff was a 
"'confused person' because of his 'mixed heritage."'249 Tensions 
came to a head during an incident in which the plaintiff commented 
that the teacher was distracting him with "interruptions" and the 
teacher responded: "That's the Caucasian blood in him makes him 
think he can say whatever he wants."250 Mter the plaintiff was 
instructed to leave the classroom, the teacher first blocked his exit; 
then, after the plaintiff tried to walk around him, the teacher placed 
him in a "choking headlock," breaking two wires from a prior cervical 
spine surgery, which forced the plaintiff to wear a neck brace and 
restricted his physical activity for six weeks.251 
247. 300 F. Supp. 2d 641 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
248. /d. at 642. 
249. /d. at 643 n.2. 
250. /d. at 643. 
251. /d. 
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The other case in which a court acknowledged animus as 
multiracial qua multiracial, Cannon v. Burkybile,252 involved a prisoner 
who filed an Equal Protection claim following repeated racial 
harassment by a guard.253 The guard challenged the prisoner's right 
to use the law library stating: "You are either a half-breed or of a 
mixed race and you shouldn't be up here. I hate all you half-breeds 
and you definitely won't be coming back to the law library this 
aftemoon."254 The guard repeatedly blocked the inmate's access to 
the library after that incident and at one point told the inmate that 
"he was the same half-breed he always hated."255 The court denied 
the defendants' motion to dismiss the Equal Protection claim, 
explaining that the plaintiff had adequately pled claims of racial 
discrimination by alleging that the guard "impeded his access to the 
1 l "b f h" . d "256 aw 1 rary ... on account o IS m1xe -race. 
Moore and Cannon share such explicit evidence of specifically 
multiracial animus that it would be extraordinary, even bizarre, for a 
court to frame either case as one of discrimination stemming from 
animus against a monoracial group. But these isolated instances-
two examples in the entire corpus of federal cases-attests to the 
rarity of judicial acknowledgment of animus that is uniquely 
multiracial in character. And of course, because both cases are 
district court cases, they lack significant precedential force. 257 
Moreover, the courts in both Moore and Cannon simply described the 
discrimination that the plaintiffs suffered without any analysis of the 
uniqueness of that discrimination to the plaintiffs' perceived 
multiracial identification. 
3. Discrimination against interracial couples: related but distinct 
Perhaps bolstered by the animating principles of Loving, courts 
have been more receptive to claims of discrimination brought by one 
member of an interracial couple. 258 One paradigmatic case is that of 
Holcomb v. Iona College,259 in which a White basketball coach who 
married a Black woman claimed that he was fired after his 
supervisor called him a "nigger lover" and asked him whether he was 
252. No. 99 C 4623, 2000 WL 1409852 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2000). 
253. !d. at *1. 
254. !d. 
255. !d. at *2. 
256. !d. at *5. 
257. Indeed, Cannon is unpublished, and its citation is therefore prohibited in 
many jurisdictions. 
258. See cases cited supra note 163. 
259. 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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"really going to marry that Aunt Jemima."260 Writing for a panel of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi 
held that a claim of adverse action based on an employee's 
association with a person of another race is cognizable under Title 
VII and agreed that the basketball coach had raised factual issues with 
respect to whether race was a motivating factor in his termination. 261 
One might argue that judicial validation of such claims is 
tantamount to an acknowledgment of multiracial identification and 
the need to protect those identified as multiracial-after all, 
protection of the unions that produce people likely to be perceived 
as multiracial is closely linked to protection against discrimination of 
multiracial people themselves. But this interpretation is too 
generous: the notion of an "interracial relationship" is predicated on 
the two people in the relationship being of different races, and this, if 
anything, reinforces the categorical foundations of antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence. In existing case law, interracial relationships are 
always characterized as occurring between two monoracial people-
no court has considered a claim of interracial discrimination brought 
by a couple of whom one member was multiracial and one member 
was monoracial. Thus, judicial sympathy for those engaged in 
interracial relationships does not equate to recognition of the unique 
form of animus directed at multiracial people. 
Moreover, some courts have resisted acknowledging our society's 
lingering hostility to interracial marriage. In United States v. Barber,262 
the Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, held that the trial court did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause when it denied the request of an 
interracial couple, tried jointly on criminal fraud charges, to question 
jurors regarding attitudes about interracial marriage.263 The majority 
held: 
[E]very criminal trial cannot be conducted as though race is an 
issue simply because the trial participants are of different races. If 
racial prejudice is ever to be eliminated, society's general concerns 
about such prejudice must not be permitted to erode the courts' 
efforts to provide impartial trials for the resolution of disputes.264 
The majority felt that "[t]he very process of exploring such factors 
would heighten their role in the decision-making process," and would 
therefore run a greater risk of corrupting the process. 265 The dissent 
260. Id. at 134. 
261. Id. at 132. 
262. 80 F.3d 964 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 
263. I d. at 970. 
264. I d. at 967. 
265. Id. at 967-68. 
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disagreed, explaining: "[N] o matter how much we dislike it, ... we 
do not live in a color blind world and . . . many individuals still 
harbor negative attitudes and feelings about marriage between blacks 
and whites. To deny that fact is to ignore a social reality."266 The 
dissent thus found persuasive the defendants' claim that they would 
need to know jurors' attitudes toward interracial marriage "when 
attempting to secure an unbiased and fair jury."267 The majority's 
resistance to acknowledging the possibility of prejudice motivated by 
an interracial relationship exemplifies some courts' skepticism about 
the extent of such prejudice and the need for remedies expressly 
tailored to address animus motivated by racial mixing. 
In summary, courts' acknowledgment of animus against interracial 
relationships does not meaningfully challenge the paradigmatic racial 
categories. While such acknowledgment does provide a measure of 
judicial recognition that society is not fully comfortable with racial 
mixing, this recognition does not actually challenge the categories 
that make racial mixing salient. And some courts remain skeptical 
both of the extent of antipathy toward racial mixing and of the 
notion that the judiciary should intervene to combat such antipathy. 
Consequently, acknowledgment of animus motivated by interracial 
relationships is not a functional substitute for claims of multiracial 
discrimination. 
C. Academic Omission 
Courts' erasure of multiracial discrimination m the 
antidiscrimination context is mirrored by scholarly literature. 
As noted, in recent years multiracial individuals have been the subject 
of extensive scholarly discussion.268 Yet such discussion almost always 
occurs when multiracial individuals are the primary subject of the 
scholarly work, and this focus is almost always linked to the diversity 
or demographic contexts.269 A search of the 'Journals and Law 
Reviews" database within Westlaw yields about fifty articles with the 
term "multiracial," "biracial," "mixed race," or "racially mixed" in the 
266. Id. at 973 (Mumahan,J., dissenting). 
267. Id. 
268. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing the focus of scholarly 
literature addressing multiracial individuals). 
269. See Jean Stefancic, Multiracialism: A Bibliographic Essay and Critique in Memory of 
Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1521, 1525-38 ( 1997) (organizing multiracial 
scholarship into seven categories-(!) interracial relationships and marriage; 
(2) racial identity; (3) racial formation; ( 4) census categories and other 
classifications; (5) essentialism and intersectionality; (6) transracial adoption and 
child custody; and (7) "toward the new multiracial society"-but omitting discussion 
of animus against those perceived as mixed-race). 
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title of the piece. While there is some overlap among topics, by my 
rough estimate, one-third of the articles discuss either the 
demographic or diversity contexts; one-third discuss the role of 
multiracial identity in the legal system from a theoretical perspective; 
and one-third use the term "multiracial" in a non-individual context 
(for example, to refer to "multiracial coalitions," meaning coalitions 
that involve more than one race). 
Only one student note has even mentioned discrimination against 
mixed-race people in relation to antidiscrimination jurisprudence: 
in the Title VII context, Ken Nakasu Davison focuses primarily on 
mixed-race individuals whose employers view them as members of a 
racial category other than the one with which they identify 
themselves.270 While exploring that topic, Davison also briefly 
summarizes the notion of multiracial discrimination.271 He explains 
that mixed-race people "are directly discriminated against because of 
their distinct mixed identity," primarily based on quasi-scientific 
arguments about multiracial individuals' inferiority due to "hybrid 
d " d " . 1 1 . . ,272 egeneracy an sociocu tura reJeCtiOn. 
But aside from Davison's work, no research has examined 
discrimination claims specifically alleging multiracial discrimination. 
Indeed, some scholarly work ignores the potential confounding 
influence of multiracial identification in the antidiscrimination 
context. For example, Kenji Yoshino relates the story of Lawrence 
Mungin, "an Mrican-American attorney who brought an unsuccessful 
race discrimination suit against his law-firm employer."273 Yoshino 
provides a thorough account of Mungin's struggle to ascend through 
the predominantly White ranks of an elite law firm. 274 Ultimately, 
after Mungin was denied promotion to partner, he filed a Title VII 
suit alleging race discrimination.275 
Yoshino focuses on Mungin's attempts to shield White people from 
the threat of his Black identity. Although Yoshino acknowledges that 
Mungin "was raised in poverty in Brooklyn and Queens by his biracial 
mother," Yoshino does not further engage the possibility that having 
270. Davison, supra note 5, at 180-85. 
271. See id. at 179-80 (arguing that racism against mixed-race individuals comes in 
the form of direct discrimination, because of the individuals' mixed-race status, as 
well as discrimination based on an incorrect assumption about the individuals' race). 
272. Id. at 179. 
273. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE LJ. 769, 879-86 (2002). 
274. See id. at 882-84 (describing Mungin's numerous efforts to assimilate through 
dress, emphasis on his academic reputation, disassociation from other Mrican-
Americans, and disregard of racial slights). 
275. I d. at 879. 
522 AMERICAN UNIVERSI1YLAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:469 
a biracial mother may have affected Mungin's life course. 276 
Was Mungin ever identified as biracial, like his mother? Did he ever 
identify himself as biracial? How did Mungin's biracial mother 
influence his interactions with others in the community? To the 
extent that Mungin identified himself or was identified by others as 
biracial, how did his mixed-race identification shape his own views 
about race? How did it affect his ability to perform his race in a way 
that was non-threatening to White people? Perhaps the impact was 
negligible, perhaps not-but the complete omission of discussion is 
noteworthy. 
A similar omission occurs in Randall Kennedy's discussion of the 
Rhinelander case. 277 Kennedy's description of the case acknowledges 
the wife's racially-mixed background, noting that she "was the 
daughter of a white mother and a black father.'ms Kennedy then 
describes the closing argument in Rhinelander as follows: 
"The attorney for Rhinelander made an all-out plea for the jury 
simply to register its disgust with inter-racial marriage. 'There isn't a 
father among you,' he declared, 'who would not rather see his son in 
his casket than to see him wedded to a mulatto woman. "'279 Yet this 
analysis of the multiracial dynamic in Rhinelander is incomplete. 
Had Kennedy quoted more of the closing argument, it would have 
become clear that the attorney's speech actually revealed not only 
antipathy toward interracial marriage, but also a unique contempt for 
those perceived as racially mixed. The sentence immediately 
following the portion Kennedy chose to quote in his article reads: 
"Decent blacks have the same feeling."280 In other words, at least 
according to the attorney, Blacks as well as Whites would rather see 
their children dead than married to a "mulatto." This statement 
draws a distinction between "mulattos" and "decent blacks," and 
suggests that perhaps at least some Whites and Blacks were unified in 
preferring not to marry those seen as racially mixed. Yet Kennedy 
elides that interpretation, describing the attorney as playing to the 
276. I d. at 880-81. Yoshino notes that Mungin's mother "considered herself to be 
black," but does not provide further analysis of her mixed race status. Id. at 880. 
Did others also consider her to be black? What about Mungin's father? The extent 
to which Mungin's early experiences involved awareness of racial mixing and racial 
fluidity may well have affected the course of his life-or they may have had no effect 
at all-but Yoshino's account does not address that possibility. 
277. See generally Kennedy, supra note 77, at 1155-56 (considering the annulment of 
a marriage between a mixed-raced woman and a White man). Rhinelander is also 
discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 47-49. 
278. Id. at 1155. 
279. Id. at 1156. 
280. Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie, supra note 49, at 2436 (citations omitted). 
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jury's disgust with "inter-racial marriage" rather than disgust at 
marrying a woman perceived as racially mixed and hence intrinsically 
impure. 
The omissions I have detailed are only two of many such scholarly 
elisions, and I have chosen them as examples simply because the 
work in which they appear is otherwise meticulous and provocative. 
But many other scholarly works also gloss over multiracial identity in 
the context of discrimination, preferring to cast their claims in terms 
of conventional discrete racial categories without even bracketing 
the possibility of non-categorical identification. This scholarly 
omission both reflects and reinforces the reluctance of the courts 
to acknowledge multiracial individuals in the antidiscrimination 
context. 
IV. "INVISIBLE PEOPLE"281 : THE ERASURE OF MULTIRACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION 
In considering claims of racial discrimination, courts typically slot 
plaintiffs into one of the five categories of Hollinger's ethno-racial 
pentagon.282 Yet animus is not always so easily classified. Society does 
not always perceive an individual's racial identity as falling into a neat 
category, and consequently racial animus is not always captured by 
one of the conventional categories.283 
Some may object that, as an empirical matter, multiracial 
identification is so rare as not to merit substantial discussion. A small 
percentage of people may be identified as multiracial-these skeptics 
may argue-but the vast majority of people are slotted into one 
category or another based on their physical appearance, and, to the 
extent that they experience discrimination, it is on the basis of their 
perceived membership in that category. "Sure, Tiger Woods has 
White, Black, Asian, and Native American ancestors," these skeptics 
may say, "but when society sees him on the street, they see a Black 
,284 
man. 
281. See, e.g., Ramona E. Douglass, Letter to the Editor, Multiracial People Must No 
Longer Be Invisible, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at A26 (arguing that multiracial people 
are "invisible statistically to the medical research community"). 
282. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra Part III. 
284. Public discourse surrounding Woods's recent disclosures of marital infidelity 
reflects preoccupation with both his racial identity and with interracial relationships. 
The fact that Woods's wife and his alleged mistresses are White adds an additional 
dimension to the scandal that, for many, affects their perception of Woods's 
behavior. Some self-identified members of the Black community describe themselves 
as less sympathetic to his situation given that he has refused to identify himself as 
Black and that he married a White woman; others express the sentiment that even 
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In response, I first reiterate the point I raised in Part I-that many 
other cues aside from physical appearance may trigger identification 
of an individual as racially mixed. Perhaps people would label Tiger 
Woods as Black if they saw him on the street, perhaps not. But if they 
heard him describe himself as "Cablinasian," as he has to reporters, 
their perceptions might change.285 I also invite skeptics to peruse one 
of the many books featuring photographs and biographies of people 
identified as racially mixed. 286 My intuition is that most people will 
have considerable difficulty visually classifYing many of the featured 
individuals using conventional racial categories, and this difficulty 
may help persuade skeptics that many individuals are, indeed, 
identified as multiracial. Finally, I emphasize that the inhospitality of 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence to multiracial people is particularly 
problematic from a forward-looking perspective. As rates of 
interracial marriage continue to increase,287 the number of 
individuals who are perceived as and discriminated against as 
multiracial will likely continue to increase as well. 
Proceeding from the conclusion that individuals identified as 
multiracial are a non-negligible segment of the population, and that 
such individuals do indeed experience a unique form of animus as 
demonstrated in Part II, this Part examines the reasons underlying 
the absence of multiracial people from antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence. It then explores the consequences of that absence 
both for individuals who are identified as multiracial and for society. 
A. Causes of Unacknowledged Multiracial Discrimination 
Multiracial individuals are largely absent from antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence for a variety of interwoven reasons. This Section rules 
given Woods's disavowal that he is Black, they would prefer to see him with a Black 
woman. See, e.g., Tiger Woods Alienates Black Community with "White Lovers, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Dec. 6, 2009, http:/ lwww.nydailynews.comlnewslnational/2009l12l0612009-
1206_tiger _ woods_alienates_black_comm unity_ with_ whi te_lovers. h tml (discussing 
the relationship of Woods's multiracial identity to public perception of the scandal 
and, remarkably, generating over six hundred comments from readers); Lisa Fritsch, 
Tiger Woods and the Problem of the "Great Black Example," AFROSPEAR, Dec. 28, 2009, 
h ttp:l I afrospear .coml2009 I 12128 I tiger-woods-and-the-problem-of-the-great-black-
example%E2%80%8F-by-lisa-fritsch (discussing hostility generated toward Woods's 
racial choices in romantic partners within the "black community"). 
285. See Kamiya, supra note 124 (noting that Tiger Woods admitted on Oprah that 
it bothered him when he was called an "African-American"). 
286. See, e.g., FULBECK, supra note 23 (introducing "Hapas," mixed-race individuals 
of Asian or Pacific Island decent, through a book that offers pictures and words from 
the Hapa population). 
287. See EDMONSTON, supra note 99, at 246 (hypothesizing that the increase in the 
population of mixed-race individuals, from 22 million to 189.1 million in the next 
century, translates also into an increase of interracial marriages). 
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out several potential causes and then posits a more plausible 
explanation for the absence. 
As the many examples in Part II demonstrate, animus against 
multiracial people is real and powerful. For some, the notion of 
racial mixing incites a visceral contempt. It is not the case, therefore, 
that antidiscrimination claims brought by multiracial people are 
uncommon because animus against multiracial people simply does 
not exist. 
Nor are there obvious constitutional, statutory, or regulatory 
barriers to such suits. Rather, the reverse is true. The Equal 
Protection Clause straightforwardly guarantees to all people 
"the equal protection of the laws,"288 while Title VII forbids 
discrimination "because of [an] individual's race."289 And the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) website specifically 
explains that "Title VII's prohibitions apply regardless of whether the 
discrimination is directed at Whites, Blacks, Asians, Latinos, Arabs, 
Native Americans, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders, multi-racial 
individuals, or persons of any other race, color, or ethnicity."290 
The EEOC's Compliance Manual does not specifically address 
multiracial individuals.291 It does note, however, that "Title VII does 
not contain a definition of 'race,' nor has the Commission adopted 
one."
292 Coupled with the explicit mention of multiracial individuals 
on the EEOC's website, the most logical reading is that the EEOC 
views discrimination against multiracial individuals as illegal and that 
it views claims of such discrimination as administratively and judicially 
cognizable. 
Having ruled out lack of multiracial animus and explicit 
governmental prohibition as explanations for the lack of 
antidiscrimination suits filed by multiracial people, we must seek 
other explanations for the invisibility of multiracial discrimination 
claims in antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Perhaps the absence of 
multiracial individuals from the antidiscrimination context is in part 
the result of monoracial self-identification by people of mixed race. 293 
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006). 
290. U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, Race/Color 
Discrimination, http:/ /archive.eeoc.gov/types/race.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
291. See EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 15: Race and Color Discrimination 
(2006), available at http:/ /www.eeoc.gov /policy I docs/ race-color. pdf. 
292. !d. at 15-3. 
293. See David L. Brunsma & Kerry Ann Rockquemore, What Does "Black" Mean? 
Exploring the Epistemological Stranglehold of Racial Categorization, 28 CRITICAL Soc. 101, 
llO (2002). 
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Many people who might be viewed by some as mixed-race identifY 
more strongly, or even exclusively, with one race or another.294 When 
such individuals suffer discrimination, they may choose to bring 
lawsuits in which they describe themselves as monoracial rather than 
multiracial. 
Although this approach might be taken in many cases, evidence 
does not support the conclusion that monoracial self-classification 
occurs in every case or even in most cases. Research indicates that 
many people who might be identified by others as multiracial also 
perceive themselves that way. For example, David Brunsma and 
Kerry Ann Rockquemore found that when participants in a study who 
identified themselves as having one Black parent and one White 
parent were given an array of identity options, only 16.7% adopted a 
"singular identity," considering themselves either exclusively Black 
(13.1 %) or exclusively White (3.6%).295 The proposition that 
multiracial people unilaterally decide to identifY themselves as 
monoracial in their claims of discrimination is therefore an 
incomplete explanation. 
Alternatively, even people who identify themselves as multiracial 
may be viewed by outsiders-employers, coworkers, classmates, and 
so on-as monoracial based on the same factors discussed in Part I. 
For example, an individual with one Black parent and one White 
parent may be labeled by others as Black based on her appearance, or 
an individual with one White parent and one Latina/ o parent may be 
labeled by others as Latina after she is overheard speaking Spanish 
with a friend. This public perception of an individual as monoracial 
may provoke the discriminatory behavior that culminates in an Equal 
Protection or Title VII claim. In such a situation, it may make logical 
narrative sense for the plaintiff to describe herself as monoracial in 
her lawsuit, regardless of how she views herself. When the 
discriminatory behavior is motivated by animus against a single race, 
identification of a plaintiff as racially mixed may not add to the 
narrative for purposes of an Equal Protection or Title VII claim and 
may even provide an unwanted distraction. This explanation, 
however, while plausible in some instances, also seems incomplete 
given the evidence of animus uniquely directed at those perceived as 
294. See, e.g., Melissa Herman, Forced to Choose: Some Determinants of Racial 
Identification in Multiracial Adolescents, 75 CHILD DEV. 730, 736 tbl.2 (2004) (surveying 
multiracial youth, ages fourteen to nineteen, and finding that, when forced to 
choose one race, sixty-eight percent of Black/White students, fifty-two percent of 
Hispanic/White students, and forty-three percent of Asian/White students chose the 
minority race instead of "White"). 
295. Brunsma & Rockquemore, supra note 293, at 110. 
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racially mixed. Perhaps multiracial people may sometimes be 
identified as monoracial and consequently decide to identifY 
themselves as such in their lawsuits, but many examples indicate that 
they are not always so identified.296 
Advice from legal counsel motivated by tactical considerations may 
also lead to the invisibility of multiracial people in antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence. The likelihood of success on an Equal Protection or 
Title VII challenge no doubt increases when a plaintiff can conform 
his or her claim to an established narrative; and as I have discussed, 
our category-dependent antidiscrimination jurisprudence consists 
primarily of narratives that embrace categories and, hence, 
monoracial identification. 297 
But the influence of legal counsel in fact indicates another 
explanation. Given that lawyers are primarily guided by the 
precedents created in judicial opinions, courts bear significant 
responsibility for the invisibility of multiracial plaintiffs. In most cases 
involving a plaintiff described as multiracial, the court failed to 
acknowledge explicitly that the plaintiff was perfectly entitled to 
bring a case as a multiracial plaintiff and that at least part of the harm 
alleged may have been unique to the perception of the plaintiff as a 
multiracial individual. The employee in Mitchell may have received 
worse treatment from her employer, not because the employer 
realized that she "was black" as the court said,298 but because her 
employer came to view her as racially mixed. The problem with the 
categorical scheme in Godby was not only that it established separate 
divisions for White and Black homecoming nominees, but also that it 
created a unique dilemma for multiracial individuals: either 
unwillingly choose one of two prescribed racial labels or else face 
exclusion from both racial categories.299 The discrimination alleged 
in Smith may well have been directed at Smith as a multiracial person 
rather than as a Black person-a logical outgrowth of Smith's own 
statement that he gets discrimination from "both sides," so he plays it 
both ways. 300 And courts' failure-as in Moore and Watkins--to 
acknowledge that people identified as racially mixed may not be 
296. See cases discussed supra notes 146-172 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra Part III.B. 
298. Mitchell v. Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642,646 (1998). 
299. See supra notes 212-229 and accompanying text. 
300. Smith v. CA, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776, at *2 (M.D. 
Fla. Dec. 30, 2008). Of course, the court's failure to engage this dynamic may result 
in part from Smith's attorney's failure to engage this dynamic in the briefs or enter it 
in the factual record. But such an absence does not need to be ignored; rather, it 
can be bracketed and highlighted as a genuine void in the record. 
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similarly situated to those identified as monoracial further obscures 
the distinct character of multiracial animus in the antidiscrimination 
context.301 
In short, courts generally fail to recognize a multiracial dynamic 
even in cases where the opinion itself notes that the plaintiff 
identifies himself as multiracial. This evasion strongly suggests that in 
other instances courts simply neglect to mention that the plaintiff 
identified himself as racially mixed in his pleadings. Given the 
reliance of antidiscrimination jurisprudence on racial categories, it is 
easiest for courts to assume that a plaintiff who works in a 
predominantly White work environment and describes himself as a 
biracial Black/White person in his pleadings was actually 
discriminated against because his employer harbored animus toward 
Black people. The same is true of other perceived racial mixtures. 
While this monoracial judicial narrative likely reflects reality in some 
circumstances, the many incidents reflecting animus targeted at 
racially mixed people indicates that it is an incomplete explanation.302 
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that courts are ignoring or 
eliding at least some cases that reflect a multiracial narrative of 
discrimination in order to harmonize those cases with traditional 
categorical doctrine. The next Section discusses the consequences of 
this elision. 
B. Consequences of Unacknowledged Multiracial Discrimination 
By ignoring multiracial discrimination in adherence to a category-
dependent antidiscrimination jurisprudence, courts create precedent 
encouraging future courts to ignore record evidence of 
discrimination directed specifically at multiracial people. This failure 
obscures the fact that-just as there are certain modes of 
discrimination targeted at Latinos, Native Americans, and so forth-
there are certain modes of discrimination triggered specifically and 
uniquely by animus toward multiracial people. 
Courts' failure to acknowledge this real animus leads to its 
trivialization or even its denial. Denial, in turn, engenders an array of 
harms: it warps the narratives of individual plaintiffs. It skews the 
development of the law, discouraging future claims of multiracial 
discrimination. And it further entrenches the crude racial categories 
in our social consciousness, along with the stereotypes associated with 
those categories. 
301. See cases discussed supra notes 240-246 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra Part II. 
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1. Damage to individual narratives of discrimination 
Narrative is a source of power.303 Catherine MacKinnon famously 
describes it as feminism's "methodological secret,"301 and other 
historically disadvantaged groups have likewise adopted narrative as a 
means to convey the injuries they have suffered.305 Among various 
forms of communication, narrative is uniquely capable of capturing 
human experience and inspiring empathy. As Steven Winter 
explains: 
The attraction of narrative is that it corresponds more closely to the 
manner in which the human mind makes sense of experience than 
does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law .... In narrative, 
we take experience and configure it in a conventional and 
comprehensible form. This is what gives narrative its 
communicative power; it is what makes narrative a powerful tool of 
persuasion and, therefore, a potential transformative device for the 
d. d 306 1sempowere . 
Deploying narrative, then, is a valuable technique by which an 
individual may convey what has happened to him. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the power of narrative, attesting to 
the persuasive force of "tell[ing] a colorful story with descriptive 
richness" rather than merely presenting sterile facts. 307 
Consequently, judicial adaptation of a party's narrative affects the 
dynamic of power surrounding a particular controversy. A court's act 
of recounting the facts of a case inherently introduces some degree 
of discrepancy from each party's original version of the facts, as well 
as some discrepancy from the events that actually transpired. Even 
the most scrupulous judicial summary will inevitably present a gloss of 
303. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and 
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE LJ. 625, 627 (explaining that, in the 
context of the Mashpee Indian case, "as with most narratives, its very telling is an 
expression of power"). 
304. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND 
LAw 5 (1987). 
305. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL jUSTICE (1987) (discussing thoughts on racial justice issues for Mrican-
Americans); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We 
Ever Be Saved?, 97YALE LJ. 923 (1988) (critiquing Bell's use of"imaginative tales" and 
a fictitious alter ego); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE LJ. 1357, 1359 
n.3 (1992) (describing itself and other narrative scholarship as "example[s] of the 
'legal storytelling' genre employed by a number of Critical Race theorists and 
feminists to analyze legal thought and culture"); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 
87 MICH. L. REv. 2073,2074 (1989) (collecting articles by Milner S. Ball, Derrick Bell, 
Mari J. Matsuda, and others on the use of stories and narratives to promote critical 
examination of dominant legal paradigms). 
306. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and 
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2228 (1989). 
307. Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172,187 (1997). 
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some sort on a party's narrative by emphasizing certain facts or 
eliding others.308 Depending on the circumstances, then, the court's 
treatment may serve either to dignify or to devalue that party's 
concerns. This narrative effect occurs regardless of the actual 
outcome of the case: a court might dignify a party's concerns and 
empathize with her situation, for example, while ultimately ruling 
against that party as a matter of law. 
The judicial decisions surrounding the life of Fred Korematsu 
illustrate the role that courts play in conferring dignity and 
distributing power through narrative.309 Dean Hashimoto 
persuasively argues that the Supreme Court's failure to include 
Korematsu's narrative of events in its decision deprived him of the 
dignity that having his story told would have conferred.310 By offering 
a generalized analysis of the authority of the United States 
government to intern Japanese citizens during wartime rather than 
acknowledging Korematsu's personal life history, the Court 
disempowered Korematsu by rendering his individual experience 
irrelevant.311 Likewise, forty years later when Korematsu's case was 
reexamined before district court judge Marilyn Patel, the issue of 
whether the judge would publish her decision in writing provoked 
more controversy than the substantive question of whether she would 
exonerate Korematsu. While the government did not oppose 
Korematsu's exoneration, it argued that a written decision was 
unnecessary; in contrast, "the Japanese American community felt 
strongly about . . . articulating the exact wrongs committed by the 
internment."312 This controversy would not have occurred but for the 
fact that the act of written judicial acknowledgment confers power 
upon those whose stories are told. 313 Patel's choice to publish a 
written decision ultimately reshaped the narrative around both 
Korematsu's experience and the Japanese internment as a whole. 314 
In assessing the courts' ability to confer or withhold power through 
narrative, I emphasize their tendency to reframe plaintiffs' individual 
308. And this gloss is in addition to whatever gloss the parties' lawyers may already 
have imposed. 
309. Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the 
exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry, including Fred Korematsu, from the 
West Coast war area without suspicion of wrongdoing was within Congress's 
warmaking power because it was impossible to determine which persons were aiding 
the japanese). 
310. Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: 
A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 AsiAN PAC. AM. LJ. 72, 114, 117 (1996). 
311. Id. at 113, 115-17. 
312. Id. at 73. 
313. Id. at 73-74. 
314. Id. 
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narratives into universal archetypes. As the result of this reframing, 
"[t]he recrafted stories replace the realities of the litigants' view of 
the 'facts' with an assimilated reality more congenial to the dominant 
culture."315 Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun have explored the 
"universalizing" function of narrative in discussing the well-known 
Mashpee Indian case.316 The Mashpee claimed that their land had 
been transferred to a nearby town without statutorily required 
approval from the federal government.317 A threshold issue in the 
case was whether the Mashpee were a "tribe" for purposes of the 
relevant statutory provisions. 318 Torres and Milun explained how the 
court relied on a definition of "tribe" already embedded in American 
legal culture, disregarding the Mashpee's understanding of their own 
identity.319 Thus, "requir[ing] a particular way of telling a story not 
only strips away nuances of meaning but also elevates a particular 
. f . ,MO F 1 verswn o events to a non-contmgent status. or examp e: 
"By imposing specific 'ethno-legal' categories such as 'Tribe' on the 
Mashpee, law universalizes their story. This universalizing process 
eliminates differences the dominant culture perceives as 
destabilizing."321 In sum, regardless of whether the court's 
construction of the word "tribe" was fair or proper, the imposition of 
such a construction aptly demonstrates the influence that existing 
cultural norms exert over judicial narrative framing. 
Claims of discrimination brought by people identified as 
multiracial and discriminated against on that basis are likewise 
subject to the influence of dominant social and cultural norms. 
The jurisprudential reliance on discrete monoracial categories may 
influence courts to reframe the narratives of multiracial plaintiffs, 
recasting them as narratives of monoracial discrimination. 
This judicial reconstruction subsumes the narratives of multiracial 
plaintiffs within the dominant legal paradigm, ultimately distorting 
those plaintiffs' narratives of what they have experienced. In the 
context of multiracial discrimination, acknowledging the multiracial 
dynamic in a particular narrative is critical to an account of the harm 
experienced. When courts reframe a narrative of discrimination 
315. Larry Cati Backer, Tweaking Jiacts, Speaking judgment: judicial 
Transmogrification of Case Narrative as jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 
6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 611, 618 (1998). 
316. Torres & Milun, supra note 303, at 630. 
317. !d. at633. 
318. !d. at 633-36. A jury ultimately found that the Mashpee were not a tribe, and 
that finding was upheld on appeal. !d. at 635-36. 
319. !d. at 654. 
320. !d. at 629. 
321. !d. at 630. 
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motivated by multiracial identification as one of discrimination 
motivated by monoracial identification, they warp or render invisible 
the specific narrative of discrimination that the individual perceived 
as mixed-race has suffered. 
Skeptics may question whether harm ensues from a court 
characterizing a particular narrative of discrimination as something 
other than what the plaintiff has alleged, particularly if this 
recharacterization does not affect the outcome of the case. I believe, 
however, that this narrative infidelity is, in fact, independently 
harmful. 
Consider the following stylized scenario. A plaintiff claims that he 
was discriminated against because he was Asian. He alleges that his 
coworkers called him a "chink," asked him whether he ate dogs, and 
mocked the shape of his eyes. He was ultimately fired for what he 
believes were pretextual reasons masking racial animus. The first 
sentence of the court's opinion is as follows: "Plaintiff alleges that he 
was discriminated against because he is Hispanic." Undoubtedly, this 
plaintiff would feel that the court had disregarded his narrative. 
Not only did the court characterize him in a way that he had not 
characterized himself, but the way in which the court characterized 
him divests the other facts of their narrative impact because they are 
not associated with the category of "Hispanic" as they are with the 
category of "Asian." My example is intentionally exaggerated, and 
the Reader's reaction is likely that the court's characterization was 
simply wrong. But that is exactly the point: just as an Asian plaintiff 
may believe it to be wrong for a court to characterize him as 
Hispanic, a multiracial plaintiff may feel it was wrong for a court to 
characterize him as monoracial. 
Thus, reframing a multiracial plaintiffs injury as one of monoracial 
discrimination inherently devalues the plaintiff's original account of 
the wrong that she suffered. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of 
the case, this reframing undermines the plaintiffs dignity by 
depriving her of the opportunity to vindicate her rights based on her 
version of her injury. It sends the plaintiff the message that her 
nuanced version of events is of no moment and that her success or 
failure depends on her ability to rework her discriminatory narrative 
to square with the paradigmatic narrative account involving 
categories. This forced revision of the plaintiffs story silences her 
voice and displaces her from a narrative to which her experience 
should be central. 
Moreover, suppression of a narrative describing the harm to an 
individual plaintiff-even if the narrative merely recasts one harm as 
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another-may produce a ripple effect of tangible negative 
consequences for that plaintiff. The denial of harm leads to 
alienation and isolation on the part of the plaintiff, rendering the 
plaintiff vulnerable to repetition of the harm in question. The denial 
of a plaintiffs narrative may lead to disenfranchisement from the 
legal system, thereby reducing the likelihood that the plaintiff will 
rely on the legal system to rectify future harms. As Richard Delgado 
explains: 
If the only narrative law recognizes is a bad one-one that requires 
that you demean yourself or tell your story in a strange or 
contorted way, or jump through very high hoops even to be heard 
at all-you will not choose to tell your story there very often.322 
By devaluing the individual multiracial plaintiff's narrative and 
recasting it as a familiar monoracial one, courts divest the plaintiff of 
the power associated with narrative integrity; likewise, they deprive 
the plaintiff of the dignity inherent in the opportunity to vindicate 
his narrative in court. Moreover, the court distances the individual 
from the legal system, decreasing the likelihood that he will place his 
trust in the legal system to address his grievances in the future. 
By rechanneling a narrative of multiracial discrimination into a 
monoracial framework, courts thus inflict an additional injury upon 
an individual already wounded by an original instance of 
discrimination. 
2. Inhospitality to claims of multiracial discrimination 
Reframing narratives of mixed-race discrimination also has 
consequences beyond the case in which the reframing occurs. Such 
reframing skews the law in favor of certain narratives of 
discrimination at the expense of others, creating precedent that 
makes legal recovery easier for plaintiffs who employ a favored 
narrative. Torres and Milun explain that narratives of racial 
discrimination "enter legal discourse in an illustrative, even 
exemplary, fashion." 323 By fitting stories of multiracial discrimination 
into a jurisprudence based on categories, courts reinforce monoracial 
narratives and decrease the likelihood of recovery based on 
multiracial discrimination. 
In some instances, the imposition of categorical norms upon 
situations of multiracial discrimination may have concrete 
consequences for plaintiffs' ability to recover. As this Article has 
322. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Elcuenth Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 
84 CAL. L. REv. 61,92-93 (1996). 
323. Torres & Milun, supra note 303, at 628. 
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noted, in Walker, the court held that for purposes of Title VII, 
a plaintiff may be considered to be a member of all the racial groups 
with which she identifies, thus limiting her ability to demonstrate that 
she was treated worse than non-members of those groups. 324 Courts 
have not widely adopted the approach advocated in Walker, but they 
also have yet to confront the issue that Walker presents in any 
systematic fashion. Given the ever-increasing rate of interracial 
marriage, it seems likely that the number of plaintiffs asserting 
identification with two, three, or even four conventional racial 
categories will increase as well. If courts do eventually adopt Walker's 
approach to defining a plaintiffs racial comparables for purposes of 
Title VII, plaintiffs who choose to identify with multiple races will 
have considerable difficulty demonstrating that they were treated 
worse than those outside their racial "classification." 
The problem Walker presents is concrete. But on a more general 
level, the failure to acknowledge multiracial discrimination means 
that individuals who suffer discrimination because they are identified 
as multiracial may choose to reframe their circumstances to fit a more 
conventional narrative of monoracial discrimination. This process 
further eclipses the existence of uniquely multiracial forms of 
discrimination. 
Several scholars have explored the impact of legal regimes on the 
interrelated issues of which narratives receive recognition and how 
plaintiffs frame their narratives. I discuss four examples here and 
then draw broader themes from their aggregation. 
The form that doctrine takes has the power to channel claims into 
specific narratives at the expense of others. In the context of Title 
VII jurisprudence, Vicki Schultz argues that law privileges certain 
narratives, explaining that its focus on sexual harassment has diverted 
attention away from the broader problems of gender inequality. 325 
She explains that the emphasis on sexuality "displac[es] attention 
away from genuine problems of sex discrimination" and "encourages 
employees to articulate broader workplace harms as forms of sexual 
harassment, obscuring more structural problems."326 For example, 
female employees may complain about sexual jokes and pornography 
in the workplace when their real concern is that they suffer from low 
status and a lack of respect. 327 Moreover, the myopic focus on sexual 
324. Walkerv. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651, at *1 
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994); see supra text accompanying notes 193-197. 
325. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE LJ. 2061, 2064 (2003). 
326. I d. at 2067. 
327. Id. 
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harassment marginalizes the experiences of women who encounter 
non-sexualized gender discrimination.328 Schultz observes that 
"sexual harassment law has taken on a life of its own, uprooted from 
the larger project of achieving gender equality that animates Title 
VII."329 Her insight may be analogized to the race discrimination 
context: Title VII was not intended to protect specific racial categories, 
but rather to eliminate racial discrimination; yet the emphasis on 
categories has resulted in the exclusion of non-categorical narratives 
from race discrimination jurisprudence. 
Such channeling also occurs in the context of discrimination based 
on racial and ethnic performance. Camille Rich explains that 
according legal recognition to certain kinds of discrimination while 
withholding such recognition from others affects the way that 
plaintiffs present their claims.330 Rich contends that Title VII should 
protect behavior associated with race and ethnicity, emphasizing that 
identity may be claimed only through "'performative' acts" and 
positing that such identity performance is critical to an individual's 
dignity and sense of self.331 She suggests that when particular forms of 
performance-based discrimination are not recognized by the courts, 
plaintiffs will seek to recharacterize their claims under a more 
hospitable regime. For example, in McGlothin v. jackson Municipal 
Separate School District,332 a teacher brought a claim of religious 
discrimination under Title VII on the ground that the school district 
where she worked fired her for wearing Mrican head wraps and 
dreadlocked hairstyles, as her Rastafarian and Hebrew-Israelite beliefs 
required. 333 While documentary evidence established that the teacher 
had communicated that she wore the hairstyles in relation to her 
"practice and heritage," the school successfully argued that she had 
never communicated the religious basis for her self-presentation.334 
Rich explains that the outcome of the case resulted from the hostility 
328. See id. at 2076-77 (discussing a judge's analysis of a sexual harassment case 
that did not focus on the harassment's sexual content, "but instead rightly stressed 
that the conduct was designed to denigrate [the plaintifl] as a woman"). 
329. I d. at 2119; see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualiz.ing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE 
LJ. 1683, 16~6-87 (1998) (highlighting that, although it appears that sexual 
motivations lie at the core of sexual harassment, "much of the gender-based hostility 
and abuse that women (and some men) endure at work is neither driven by the 
desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content"). 
330. Rich, supra note 20, at 1145-46. 
331. Id. at ll76-79. 
332. 829 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Miss. 1992). 
333. I d. at 854. 
334. I d. at 855, 858-60. 
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f 1 . b d " . 1 r£ ,335 B o courts to c atms ase on raCia pe ormance. ecause a race 
discrimination claim was not available under these circumstances, 
the teacher "sought to recharacterize her claims as religious 
discrimination. "336 
Identity categories likewise channel claims. Kenneth Karst explains 
that identity categories-for example, race or sexual orientation-are 
simply myths that society writes.337 Judicial opinions exert a form of 
control over this social mythology because they "teach[] that the 
identity category exists, and that membership in the category implies 
a pattern of behavior within the story lines conventionally associated 
with the category."338 Consequently, "[1] aw maintains a vocabulary of 
identities and sometimes even channels claims (and thus claimants) 
into recognized identity categories with conventional scripts for 
behavior."339 By choosing how to frame and address plaintiffs' 
allegations of racial discrimination, courts dictate the 
acknowledgment of certain identities and the narratives of 
discrimination associated with them. By reframing or omitting 
certain narratives, courts perpetuate the erasure of other identities 
and narratives. 
Finally, specifically with respect to racial categories, Juan Perea has 
argued that the pervasiveness of the Black/White paradigm in legal 
scholarship and jurisprudence has led to the suppression of other 
narratives of discrimination.340 Because that paradigm implicitly 
requires other groups to analogize their experience to that of the 
relationship between Blacks and Whites, "reliance on the binary 
paradigm leads to the exclusion and marginalization of other 
racialized people who also suffer from racism."341 This 
marginalization has tangible consequences, particularly where the 
analogy is imperfect. For example, a non-Black racial minority may 
335. Rich, supra note 20, at 1208 (finding that the court dismissed the plaintiff's 
claim because she "never represented these activities as religious but rather as 
associated with race"). 
336. /d. 
337. Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Porlraits of Race and 
Sexual Orientation, 43 UClA L. REv. 263, 283 (1995) ("We 'make up people,' 
inventing categories .... "). 
338. /d. at 293. 
339. /d. at 295. 
340. Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of 
American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1213, 1213, 1215 (1997) (focusing on the 
exclusion of Latinos from "full membership and participation in racial discourse"). 
341. /d. at 1221; see also Stephen Reinhardt, Guess Whos Not Coming to Dinner!!, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1993) (reviewing DERRICK BElL, FACTS AT THE BOTTOM 
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992)) (criticizing Bell's binary 
Black/White racial narrative as failing to reflect the complexities of race in America). 
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suffer from forms of discrimination that are not directly comparable 
to anything within the Black/White binary paradigm. Perea suggests 
that courts may have been indifferent to claims of discrimination 
based on accent and language in part because the Black/White 
binary remains central to scholarship and jurisprudence, and accent 
and language are not traditional components of that binary narrative 
of discrimination. 342 In other words, the prevailing legal paradigm 
shaped the development-or rather, lack of development-of 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. 
I do not take a position on the substantive merits of the broader 
arguments that each of these four scholars advances in their 
respective works. But relevant to this Article, each has presented 
compelling evidence that whether a court chooses to recognize a 
certain narrative influences how future plaintiffs will present their 
claims.343 Karst and Perea emphasize that such influence extends 
specifically to the categories that plaintiffs use to describe their 
claims. And if a narrative is recognized, the way that the court frames 
that recognition in its opinion likewise influences the fate of future 
plaintiffs. First, the precedent created by judicial opinions shapes 
how plaintiffs will choose to characterize their narratives of 
discrimination. And second, the presence or absence of such 
precedent influences the likelihood that plaintiffs will succeed in the 
event that they do frame their narratives in a particular way. 
The lack of precedent relating to discrimination against people 
identified as multiracial creates a powerful incentive for plaintiffs to 
present the discrimination they have suffered as a monoracial 
narrative. Indeed, attorneys are likely to advise them to do so. In our 
342. Perea, supra note 340, at 1238-39. I suspect that some Readers will question 
Perea's assertion that accent and language fall wholly outside the narrative of 
discrimination associated with the Black/White binary paradigm. However, in many 
parts of the country, people associate a certain dialect with Black speakers, and many 
Black immigrants have non-American accents and speak languages other than 
English. See, e.g., Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should Protect 
Speakers of Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 645 (1998) (finding that 
"recruiters are less likely to offer a job to a Black English speaker" and that "black 
speech patterns were an immediate marker of an undesirable job candidate"); Rich, 
supra note 20, at 1162 (noting that when a "caller has triggered a cultural code 
associated with a low-status race or ethnic group ... [he], as a consequence, 
is denied a[] [job] opportunity"). Although I disagree with Perea that accent and 
language are irrelevant to the Black/White paradigm, I do believe that these 
attributes are less central to the narrative of Black/White discrimination than they 
are to narratives involving non-Black minorities. So to the extent that the 
Black/White paradigm represents the dominant model for thinking about race, 
Perea is correct that the courts' inhospitality to accent and language claims reflects 
the fact that such claims receive lower priority within the Black/White paradigm. 
343. I do not take a position on the substantive merits of the broader arguments 
that each of these four scholars advances in their respective works. 
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common law system, after all, the attorney's goal is to analogize her 
client's case as closely as possible to previous cases. When little 
precedent exists for claims of discrimination against those viewed as 
multiracial, an attorney is likely to analogize her client's case to those 
involving monoracial discrimination. While nothing prevents the 
attorney from analogizing a claim of mixed-race discrimination to 
one of monoracial discrimination-just as nothing automatically 
prevents an analogy between a case involving a Latina plaintiff and 
one involving an Asian plaintiff-the attorney may decide that 
introducing a multiracial dimension to the claim will provide 
unnecessary distraction. For example, in a Title VII claim, 
mentioning that a particular plaintiff is part Asian and part White 
may raise questions in the judge's mind about whether the plaintiff is 
in fact in a different racial category from her comparables, regardless 
whether the proffered comparables are Asian or White. It may 
inspire the defendant to argue that it never viewed the plaintiff as a 
member of the minority group, or cause the judge to wonder about 
the same issue. Or it may simply present the judge with an unfamiliar 
scenario, one that does not necessarily resonate as one of 
discrimination or generate empathy for the plaintiff. 
The incentive to cast a claim as monoracial becomes even stronger 
when the plaintiff has suffered discrimination that is not clearly 
monoracial or multiracial in character, or that has elements of both. 
Consider, for example, a case such as Smith, where the plaintiff 
alleged that his coworkers referred to him as "bitch" and "boy" and 
made repeated comments about Mrican-American fathers. 344 This 
narrative of discrimination is frankly ambiguous, particularly in light 
of Smith's explicit request that his company's human resources 
department reclassifY him as Caucasian rather than Mrican-
American, making his mixed-race identity salient to his coworkers.345 
But in such cases, it is far easier to couch the narrative as one of 
discrimination straightforwardly involving animus against Mrican-
American individuals. Previous cases provide a well-trodden narrative 
path that makes the briefing more straightforward; by describing the 
plaintiff as Black, the attorney need not worry about addressing 
344. Smith v. CA, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776, at *1 (M.D. 
Fla. Dec. 30, 2008). 
345. As noted, "bitch" and "boy," when addressed to adult men, are terms perhaps 
most associated with animus against Black individuals. But the comment about 
African-American fathers may be either the expression of further animus against 
Black individuals, or it might be the expression of animus against racial mixing and 
against Smith for being racially mixed. See supra notes 230-237 and accompanying 
text. 
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multiracial discrimination that deviates, even slightly, from this well-
trodden path. 
And even if a plaintiff decides to couch his claim as a narrative of 
discrimination based on others' perception of him as multiracial, the 
lack of precedent would reduce his likelihood of success. A court 
familiar with a monoracial narrative from innumerable prior Title VII 
cases is predisposed to be amenable to a similar claim. As Richard 
Ford observes, "(j]udges are likely to want the culture to be fixed and 
knowable,"346 and multiracial discrimination introduces an element of 
uncertainty and fluidity that judges have substantial incentives to 
reject. The court's dismissive response to the plaintiff's claims in 
Walker illustrates the unlikelihood of success as a multiracial plaintiff: 
there, the court declined even to discuss how a mixed-race plaintiff 
might proceed with a claim.347 In short, judges are unlikely to want to 
address the issue of discrimination against those perceived as 
multiracial unless it is clear to them that they have no alternative but 
to do so. 
In sum, the paucity of claims brought by plaintiffs identified as 
multiracial creates a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Plaintiffs' 
attorneys are less likely to frame cases in terms of multiracial 
discrimination because it makes strategic sense to adhere to an 
existing narrative of discrimination based on one of the five well-
known monoracial categories. In the rare instances when plaintiffs 
choose to frame their cases by invoking multiracial discrimination, 
courts are more inclined to view such cases with skepticism, both 
because little precedent has addressed this unfamiliar situation and 
because addressing the situation involves complicated analytical work 
that the court may be unwilling to perform. Thus, if courts continue 
to reframe cases involving multiracial discrimination, the cycle of 
erasure will continue to repeat itself. Meanwhile, discrimination 
against people perceived as multiracial will remain unaddressed, and 
the existence of such discrimination will remain obscured. 
3. Instantiation of racial categories and associated stereotypes 
Serious negative consequences flow from continued reliance on 
racial categories in antidiscrimination jurisprudence, including harm 
346. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 7l (2005). 
347. Walker v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651, at *1 
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994) (rejecting the plaintiffs contention that the protected class 
under the McDonnell Douglas framework is limited to mixed-race persons "because it 
would be impracticable to apply and could be so self limiting that a particular person 
is the only identifiable member ofthe group"). 
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to individual narrative integrity and obstacles to raising claims of 
multiracial discrimination. But perhaps the most troubling harm is 
the impediment to progress toward a more nuanced understanding 
of racism and, consequently, of the social construct of race itself. 
There is no inherent reason for our racial categories to be the way 
they are. Indeed, less than a century ago, our classification of races 
was quite different.348 Consequently, our exclusive reliance on 
arbitrary socially constructed categories in antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence calcifies our current understanding of race as well as 
the stereotypes that attend each racial category. Karst elaborates that 
"the very act of [assigning an identity category in a judicial decision] 
serves to intensify categorical meanings-the social truths about what 
it means to be black or white[,] ... etching these group portraits 
more deeply in the consciousness of those members of society who 
learn of the decision."34\1 Because our antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence continually reinforces these categories, they remain 
the salient framework for thinking about race, and they prevent more 
nuanced understandings. As Ian Haney Lopez explains: "(L]aw 
constructs race."350 
Cognitive psychology research exposes the power of legal regimes 
to reinforce existing rigid racial classifications. When people are 
exposed to, or "primed" with, a particular categorical framework for 
thinking about the world, that framework persists even when the 
source of the priming is removed. One precept of modern 
psychology is that past experience structures present thinking-in 
other words, "people understand the world by relating what they are 
currently experiencing to the knowledge that they have previously 
accumulated."351 That knowledge is largely organized into "cognitive 
structures."352 In interpreting new information, therefore, we are 
inclined to gravitate toward these existing cognitive structures.353 
348. See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE (2006) (tracing the legal construction of "whiteness" and examining the way 
that construction of non-white identities has evolved over the past century). 
Of course, it would be disingenuous to deny that the categories of "White" and 
"Black" did not exist a hundred years ago; however, Lopez ably demonstrates that the 
boundaries of these categories were in fact permeable and that the "intermediate" 
racial categories we recognize today bear little resemblance to those of the early 
twentieth century. See id. at 27-77. 
349. Karst, supra note 337, at 282. 
350. LOPEZ, supra note 348, at 7. 
351. Constantine Sedikides & John J. Skowronski, The Law of Cognitive Structure 
Activation, 2 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 169, 169 (1991). 
352. Id. 
353. See C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking 
Categorically About Others, 51 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 93, 96 (2000) (noting that people 
2010] jUDICIAL ERASURE OF MIXED-RACE DISCRIMINATION 541 
Reliance on the familiar "offers tangible cognitive benefits, such as 
rapid inference generation and the efficient deployment of limited 
processing resources."354 In short, people are much more likely to 
remember and process information in terms of preexisting cognitive 
structures-such as those cognitive structures involving race.355 
In its reliance on racial categories, antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence provides exactly the type of cognitive structure that we 
are predisposed to adopt. By couching their analysis in terms of 
Hollinger's ethno-racial pentagon, courts shape and reinforce the 
thinking of judges, attorneys, policymakers, scholars, law students, 
and other stakeholders who read their opinions. These readers, 
in turn, react to the case through subsequent judicial decisions, legal 
scholarship, statutory enactments, policies, print and television media 
coverage, and blogs. And these sources gradually shape popular 
consciousness: "Ul udicial stories are spread among the general 
population and are absorbed as part of our popular culture."356 
By adhering to a particular racial framework, then, courts calcify that 
framework in the minds of the readers, who in turn transmit that 
framework throughout society. 
The reinforcement of a perceptual framework is particularly 
troubling with respect to race because the set of categories it imposes 
is not neutral in nature. When hazel-eyed people confront a form 
that asks them to list their eye color as either brown or green, they 
may experience minor annoyance, or may feel that the options they 
have are descriptively inaccurate. In the situation of race, however, 
this mild irritant is eclipsed by the fact that the existing racial 
categories, once activated, trigger a host of associated stereotypes. 357 
In many instances, the stereotype is triggered even when only the 
racial category (rather than the stereotype itself) is primed.358 Thus, 
usually "construct and use categorical representations to simplifY and streamline the 
person perception process"); Sedikides & Skowronski, supra note 351, at 170 
(explaining that individuals tend to view things "in terms of one or two cognitive 
stntctures at a time," even though there may be a "variety of cognitive structures" 
through which something could be understood). 
354. Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 353, at 105. 
355. See, e.g., Bower et al., Hierarchical Retrieval Schemes in Recall of Categorized Word 
Lists, 8 j. OF VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 323 (1969) (presenting experiments 
involving categorized word lists). 
356. Backer, supra note 315, at 614. 
357. See, e.g., Lorella Lepore & Rupert Brown, Category and Stereotype Activation: 
Is Prqudice Inevitable?, 72 J. OF PERSONALI1Y & Soc. PSYCHOL. 275, 283-84 (1997) 
(explaining the "inevitability of sterotype activation"); Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra 
note 353, at 100 (describing the process through which stereotypes are assimilated by 
the mind and then triggered by external stimuli). 
358. Lepore & Brown, supra note 357, at 276, 283-84 (noting differences in 
stereotype activation between high- and low-prejudice individuals depending on 
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the negative cognitive associations flow from the use of the category 
itself. 
Cognitive psychology research has documented the ease with which 
racial stereotypes are activated merely by invocation of the racial 
category. For example, several studies have demonstrated that police 
officers may be more likely to shoot an unarmed Black suspect than 
an unarmed White suspect in a computer simulation.359 Stereotyping, 
then, is subconscious and involuntary, and the activation of 
stereotypes occurs even among individuals whose beliefs are 
fundamentally egalitarian.360 Consequently, by reinforcing the 
existence of a given set of racial categories, courts are also reinforcing 
the stereotypes attached to those categories. And the reification of 
stereotypes likewise perpetuates the well-documented problem of 
th 361 stereotype reat. 
In sum, research indicates that adherence to racial categories in 
the antidiscrimination context reifies and entrenches those 
categories in our collective social consciousness. Further, this 
entrenchment solidifies the stereotypes associated with those 
categories. The continued reliance on categories, in short, prevents 
social progress away from racism and racial stereotyping. Yet many 
scholars have expressed hesitation about dispensing with categories. 
In the next Part, I sketch the contours of a functional 
antidiscrimination regime that would allow for assertion of non-
categorical discrimination without necessarily eliminating categories 
altogether. 
whether the stereotype or merely the category associated with the stereotype was 
primed, but also noting that stereotypic associations resulted for many research 
subjects merely as a result of category priming). 
359. See, e.g., Joshua Correll eta!., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial 
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, INTERPERSONAL REL. & GROUP PROCESSES (2007), available 
at http:/ /www.apa.org/journals/releases/psp9261006.pdf (finding that both 
community members and police officers had slower response times in deciding how 
to react to Black suspects as opposed to White suspects in a shooting simulation); 
E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' 
Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180 (2004), available at http:/ I 
www.psychologicalscience.org/pdf/ps/racialbias.pdf (noting that police officers 
were able to eliminate their biases only after extensive training). 
360. Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 353, at 109-13. 
361. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual 
Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613,613 (1997) (describing the "stereotype 
threat" as "the threat that others' judgments or [one's] own actions will negatively 
stereotype" an individual). 
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V. "THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER"362 : RECONCILING 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND MULTIRACIAL IDENTIFICATION 
I do not advocate that we remedy the deficiency of racial categories 
simply by adding a new category-"multiracial"-thereby converting 
the ethno-racial pentagon into a hexagon. A multiracial category 
would itself reify prevailing racial classifications by implying that a 
multiracial person is the offspring of two members of such "pure" 
races. And the heterogeneity of those who might be identified as 
multiracial itself undermines the utility of such a classification. 
Grouping a biracial Black/White individual together with a biracial 
Asian/Latina individual impedes recognition of the considerable 
differences in the lived experiences of the two individuals. 
A multiracial category, then, is not the answer, at least not within the 
setting created by the core legal principles that comprise our 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. 
Some scholars have acquiesced to the inevitability of categories. 
Ruth Colker, for instance, argues that "[c]ategorization under the 
law ... is inevitable," and that "we can be sure that categories will 
always be the basis of our legal system."363 Martha Minow agrees: 
"Cognitively, we need simplifying categories . . . . Ideas that defy neat 
categories are difficult to hold on to, even if the idea itself is about 
the tyranny of categories."364 The solution, these scholars believe, 
is to employ better categories: "Recognizing that categories are 
indispensable, we should consider how categories can be improved so 
as not to play a role in the destruction of human identity."365 And as a 
general matter, scholars writing about race implicitly accept the need 
for categories without challenging or discussing that need. 
Despite the longstanding reliance on categories within 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence, the categorical model need not 
and should not remain the paradigm for recognizing racial 
discrimination to the exclusion of all other paradigms. Rather, we 
should aspire to a more fluid understanding of race, one that 
acknowledges animus directed against a person's perceived race 
without an attendant need to define that person's "objective" racial 
identity or to place that person in a category. A jurisprudence 
362. Clara E. Rodriguez et al., Latino Racial Identity: In the eye of the Beholder?, 
2 LATINO STUD.J. 33 (1991) (describing the wide variety of ways in which Latinos 
identity themselves and are identified by others). 
363. RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MUL TIRACJALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER 
AMERICAN LAW xiii (1996). 
364. Martha Minow,justice f<.ngendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 64 (1987). 
365. COLKER, supra note 363, at xiii. 
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constructed around that understanding would focus entirely on 
whether the perception of someone's race-whatever that perceived 
race might be-motivated discriminatory treatment. Analyzing the 
relationship between racial perception and discriminatory treatment 
could, but would not have to, proceed by reference to defined racial 
identity categories. 
Existing jurisprudence already indicates that courts are competent 
to examine how a person's race is perceived. In Perkins v. Lake County 
Department of Utilities,366 for example, the plaintiff filed a Title VII 
claim alleging that he was discriminated against because he was 
American-Indian.367 His employer countered that the plaintiff was 
not, in fact, American-Indian and introduced copious evidence 
attempting to disprove his claim of ancestry.368 The court held that 
the evidence as to the plaintiffs ancestry was inconclusive, but that he 
could prevail so long as he demonstrated that his employer believed he 
was an American-Indian, regardless whether he was "actually" an 
American-Indian.369 The Perkins court's reliance on the employer's 
perception, rather than an "objective" notion of race, demonstrates 
that such an approach could be readily applied to cases involving 
multiracial discrimination. 
The approach of examining an employer's perception also 
parallels courts' willingness, in the disability context, to entertain 
claims that a plaintiff suffered discrimination because he was 
"regarded as" a person with a disability. The Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) defines a person with a "disability" to include 
an individual who is "regarded as having" a "physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
• • • ,31o I M h U . d n l S . l 371 c I th actiVIties. n urp y v. nzte rarce ervzce, nc., 10r examp e, e 
Supreme Court would have allowed the plaintiff to proceed with his 
claim if he had "create[d] a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether [he] is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing 
his skills."372 In other words, under the ADA, the plaintiff does not 
need to show that he was in fact disabled according to the statutory 
definition; he only needs to show that other people saw him as being 
366. 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
367. Id. at 1262. 
368. Id. at 1266-69. 
369. Id. at 1277-78. 
370. 42U.S.C.§12102(1)(A),(C) (WestSupp.2009). 
371. 527 u.s. 516 (1999). 
372. Id. at 524 (emphasis added). 
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disabled.m The fact that courts have found the "regarded as" model 
manageable in the disability context indicates that it would be 
serviceable in the race discrimination context as well. Indeed, 
it would be ideally suited to race discrimination because the 
discriminator's perspective is central to the act of discrimination. 
Given that courts are capable of examining racial perception, it is a 
short step to decouple that examination from the notion of 
categories. Moreover, the jurisprudence I propose would not jettison 
categories altogether. Rather, my approach would largely 
supplement, rather than overhaul, our current antidiscrimination 
legal regime. 
Nothing in the constitutional and statutory provisions from which 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence flows mandates linkage of a 
discrimination claim to a category. The Equal Protection Clause 
states simply: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."374 As discussed in Part III, the application of that guarantee to 
race via a categorical mechanism is a judicial creation.375 Thus, a 
demonstration that one was denied the equal protection of the laws 
does not inherently require a demonstration of membership in, or 
discrimination in reference to, a category. If a particular law or 
regulation intentionally classifies individuals on the basis of race and 
treats some worse than others on that basis, certainly evidence of that 
disparate treatment and the underlying discriminatory intent should 
provide grounds for a legal remedy. But if that same provision results 
in worse ·treatment for an individual identified as multiracial, 
identification with a particular racial category should not be a 
prerequisite to recovery. Rather, simply showing that the individual's 
ascribed racial identity-whatever that ascribed identity might be-
was the basis for discrimination should suffice to allow the plaintiff to 
recover. 
Likewise, Title VII already makes it unlawful for an employer to 
"fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
373. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (A) ("An individual meets the requirement of 'being 
regarded as having such an impairment' if the individual establishes that he or she 
has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual 
or perceived mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is 
perceived to limit a major life activity. n) 0 
374. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
375. See supra notes 174-189 and accompanying text. 
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individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."376 It also 
makes it unlawful to "limit, segregate, or classify [any] employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee" based on his protected 
status.377 
Thus, similar to the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII prohibits 
discrimination based on race generally-not necessarily based on 
membership in a recognized racial category.378 In practice, of course, 
courts examine categories as a means to determine whether a 
plaintiff was treated worse than those "outside the protected class" to 
which the individual belonged.379 Identification of a protected class, 
with members both within and outside that class, serves as a 
shorthand for determining whether a plaintiff was treated worse 
based on her race. But neither modification of the statute nor a 
radical revision of existing jurisprudence is required to contend that 
the court need not say what race a mixed-race person is or what race 
her com parables are. The plaintiff need only show that the employer 
perceived her as racially different and that she was subjected to 
discrimination on account of this perceived difference. By adopting 
such a regime, courts would place the emphasis on the employer's 
illegitimate use of perceived racial difference as a means for making 
employment decisions, rather than on needlessly forcing the plaintiff 
to relate her narrative in the context of categories. In some 
instances, surely, categories would be invoked; but such invocation 
would be a means to show the illegitimate discrimination between 
two people based on a perceived racial disparity, not an end in itself. 
This approach would circumvent the conundrum foreseen by the 
court in Walker, which held that "[m]ultiracial persons may be 
considered members of each of the protected groups with which they 
have any significant identification."380 The Walker court's solution is 
logically questionable, given that an employer may perceive a mixed-
race individual quite differently from the way the employer perceives 
376. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
377. /d. § 2000e-2(a) (2). 
378. The EEOC's Compliance Manual, which abstains from defining race, reflects 
this non-categorical approach to racial identification and discrimination. See EEOC 
Compliance Manual, supra note 291. 
379. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (stating that, in 
evaluating whether the petitioner's professed reason for not hiring the respondent 
was merely pretext, one could look at whether White employees engaged in similar 
behavior but nevertheless retained employment). 
380. Walkerv. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651, at *1 
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994). 
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members of the various categories with which that individual might 
be identified. My approach, therefore, shifts the focus to the 
employer's perception rather than creating an artificial affiliation 
between the individual perceived as multiracial and the categories 
with which she has "any significant identification." Moreover, 
the approach I advocate is also appropriately forward-looking. 
As discussed previously, the rising rates of interracial marriage are 
likely to make the now-idiosyncratic problem Walker presents far 
. . £ d d 381 more common 1n JUSt a ew eca es. 
Furthermore, Mitchell illustrates how this approach would reshape 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence more indirectly, ultimately making 
it more hospitable to claims of multiracial discrimination. In Mitchell, 
the court categorized the self-identified Black/White plaintiff as 
Black, stating that the plaintiff suffered worse treatment after her 
employer noticed that she was visited at the store where she worked 
by Black relatives and consequently "discovered . . . that she was 
black."382 But instead of this category-induced simplification of her 
narrative, the court could have said something similar to the 
following: 
Plaintiff alleges that she suffered an adverse employment action 
after she was visited at work by Black friends and relatives and that 
at one point her employer commented-with a negative 
implication-that plaintiff only dated Black men. If established, 
these allegations would likely allow plaintiff to succeed on her 
claim that she suffered discrimination because of her race. 
Plaintiff has testified that her mother is White and that her father is 
Black and that many people, at least initially, view her as Latina 
and/ or White. Consequently, the alleged discrimination may have 
occurred because her employer came to view her as Black. 
Alternatively, it may have occurred because her employer viewed 
her as racially mixed. Regardless, if plaintiff can show that the 
adverse employment action was based upon her employer's 
perception of her race, it occurred in violation of Title VII and she 
is entitled to compensation. 
Although this approach, if applied in Mitchell, would not have 
affected the result of the case-i.e., the plaintiff would still have 
received court-appointed counsel and would still have been 
permitted to proceed to trial-it would have acknowledged the 
manner in which the plaintiff presented her claim, and it would have 
381. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (compiling statistics on the 
increasing rate of interracial marriage). 
382. Mitchell v. Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 650 (E.D. Tex. 1998). 
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created precedent upon which future multiracial-identified plaintiffs 
might more readily identify as multiracial.383 
In the Title VII context, this reinterpretation of current 
jurisprudence could have the effect of creating a question of fact as to 
whether two people were racially similarly situated from the 
perspective of the employer. But this factual component is entirely 
compatible with the current Title VII burden-shifting analysis 
established in McDonnell Douglas and refined in Burdine. That analysis 
requires the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case by showing: 
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the 
position which she held or to which she applied; (3) rejection for the 
position despite her qualifications; and ( 4) selection of an individual 
outside the protected class to replace the plaintiff.384 The burden 
then "shifts to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] rejection"'; if the 
defendant meets that burden, the plaintiffs task is then to create a 
factual dispute as to whether the defendant's proffered reason is 
pretextual. 385 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing such a genuine 
factual question, then the case may proceed to trial. 
My proposed modification to the current analysis would simply add 
flexibility to the definition of "protected class," allowing the 
protected class to consist of any set of individuals that the employer 
disfavored because of their perceived race; any individuals outside of 
that set would be outside the protected class. In Moore, for example, 
the factfinder would have had to determine whether the self-
described dark-skinned Mrican-American plaintiff was perceived by 
the employer as racially similarly situated to the lighter-skinned 
biracial individual who replaced her.386 This question may be 
difficult; it may involve ambiguous evidence about the employer's 
treatment of the two individuals; and ultimately, it may involve a 
common sense judgment. But it is exactly this type of judgment for 
which we traditionally rely on juries. Such an approach makes far 
more sense than the Moore court's bald assertion that a light-skinned 
biracial individual and a dark-skinned African-American individual 
383. Such consequences would address concerns relating both to narrative 
integrity, discussed in Part IV.B.1, and the inhospitality of antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence to claims by people identified as multiracial, discussed in Part IV.B.2. 
384. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In Burdine, the Court noted that the 
burden of establishing such a prima facie case "is not onerous." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. 
Affairsv. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981). 
385. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citations omitted). 
386. See Moore v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2006 WL 2701058, at *4 
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006). 
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are members of the same crude, socially constructed racial category 
and that the latter consequently failed to state a prima facie case of 
discrimination under Title VII. 387 
In advocating for jurisprudential recognition of those who are 
discriminated against because they are perceived as multiracial, I wish 
to acknowledge three potential critiques of my proposal. First, 
I anticipate the objection that my proposal would engender 
essentialization by creating a new category of individuals who would 
be subjected to a stereotyped mythology of identity. But in the model 
I have proposed for the antidiscrimination context, any risk of 
essentialism would be substantially mitigated by the focus on outside 
perception rather than on inherent identity. The fact that others 
identify various individuals as racially mixed does not necessarily 
impute any essence to the group itself. Moreover, those identified as 
multiracial are resistant to essentialization almost by definition. 
The multiracial-identified are a remarkably heterogeneous group, 
displaying no consistent physical markers, language, accent, 
associations, or behaviors signifying multiraciality. Essentialization is 
unlikely simply because little material exists from which one might 
construct an essence. Acknowledging discrimination against those 
perceived as multiracial is thus unlikely to instantiate the identity of 
multiracial people as a group. 
Second, I wish to address the critique that acknowledgment of 
animus directed at multiracial people would reify the traditional 
racial classifications rather than destabilize them. The notion that an 
individual is racially mixed implicitly reinforces the notion that pure 
races exist: if someone is a racially mixed person, it must be because 
he has ancestors of at least two different races, which implies that 
different races exist in some form beyond social construction. I take 
this concern particularly seriously because one of my goals is to 
promote a more nuanced and fluid understanding of race, and if 
recognizing multiracial discrimination in fact serves to calcify the 
traditional racial categories, then my project is largely self-defeating. 
Once again, however, I believe that focusing on the perception of the 
discriminator avoids this undesirable result. The fact that a racist 
individual discriminates against someone she perceives as racially 
mixed does not reinforce the existing racial classification system; 
rather, it exposes that classification system as a product of the 
discriminator's own perception. Indeed, by calling attention to the 
way that various social cues can arbitrarily cause a discriminator to 
387. See id. 
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perceive someone as racially mixed, the jurisprudential framework I 
propose would also force us to recognize the arbitrariness of the 
traditional racial categories themselves. 
Third, I do not believe that modifying antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence to render it more hospitable to individuals perceived 
as multiracial would create a logical slippery slope culminating in 
recognition of self-proclaimed multiracial people in every legal 
context. I recognize the myriad problems involved in the creation of 
a multiracial category on the census and other official government 
forms, which other scholars have discussed in considerable detail. 388 
While I believe that these concerns are significant and that they 
deserve serious consideration, I need not address them here because 
my project has no automatic implications for other contexts. 
The core provisions of our antidiscrimination jurisprudence-the 
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII-are uniquely focused on the 
perception and intent of the person perpetrating the discrimination, 
and consequently, the approach I advocate here embraces an "other-
identified" conception of racial identity. Other contexts-the 
diversity and demographic contexts, for example-require a separate 
debate over what conception of identity to embrace. 389 I therefore 
take no position on the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
acknowledging multiracial identity-whether other-ascribed or self-
imposed-outside of the provisions I have discussed. 
Ultimately, my advocacy of acknowledging animus against those 
identified as multiracial reflects my belief that our race 
discrimination jurisprudence should focus on racism rather than on 
the social constructs we call races.390 We should aspire to develop a 
jurisprudence that does not rely on categories per se, but rather 
targets animus directed at an individual due to a particular 
perception of his race. I have proposed here the shape that such a 
jurisprudence could take, and I believe that the implementation of 
such a jurisprudence is both possible and desirable. 
388. See, e.g., THE NEW RACE QUESTION, supra note 6. 
389. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
390. Cf John 0. Calm ore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1067, 1074 (1997) ("Ironically, while the nation is increasingly 
preoccupied with matters and formations of race, there is a general perception that 
racism is receding from the national ethos, and this perception only serves to 
empower racist forms and expressions."). 
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CONCLUSION 
Multiracial individuals have long vexed courts and commentators 
because they challenge and confound existing racial categories. 
Despite the recognition that multiracial individuals have received in 
some contexts, the reliance of antidiscrimination jurisprudence on 
categories has generally excluded plaintiffs identified as multiracial. 
This absence obscures animus directed at multiracial individuals. 
Moreover, the dominance of racial categories calcifies existing racial 
classifications and the stereotypes associated with them, preventing 
society from moving beyond these arbitrary categories. 
Courts, therefore, should view the jurisprudential conundrum of 
multiracial discrimination as an opportunity. Acknowledging 
multiracial identity and meticulously discussing the discrimination 
associated with it provides courts with a context in which to 
acknowledge the complexity of lived race. That ongoing project 
promises an opportunity to destabilize our preconceptions about race 
and the hierarchy that accompanies them. 
